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Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an
Information Economy
MARINA LAO*
This Article addresses the needfor afederal trade secrets law. Trade secrets
law, once considered a secondary source of intellectual property protection for less
significant innovations, has evolved into an important incentive for innovation in
the information age. Given its new prominence, as well as the increasing
connection between trade secrets and interstate andforeign commerce, the lack of
uniformity in the state law that was once acceptable is now problematic. The lack
of uniformity seriously impacts interstate commerce and raises extraordinary
choice oflawproblems. Additionally, to the extent that some of the states' laws may
fail to meet the minimum standards for trade secret protection that were established
in major international trade agreements to which the United States is a party, a
federal trade secrets law may actually be necessary to bring the United States into
compliance.
This Article contends that afederal trade secrets law will find constitutional
support in Congress 's commerce power and, perhaps, the foreign affairs power.
Although enacting such a law may be politically sensitive in the era of "new
federalism, " this Article concludes that the economic circwnstances existing today
justify such an action as a matter ofpolicy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade or so, information-based technologies, including computers
and telecommunications, have so transformed American businesses that the nineties
are said to be the information aged1 With the evolution of the economy, trade
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1 See, e.g., Stan Davis & Jim Botkin, The Coming of Knowledge-Based Business, HARV.
Bus. REV., Sept-Oct 1994, at 165, 167 (asserting that we are "on the cusp" of a knowledge-based
economy---'knowledge meaning the application and productive use of information'); Michael J.
Mandel, Commentary: Uncle Sam Should Count Sofiware, Not Buggy Wh ips, Bus. WK., Dec. 16,
1996, at 32 (asserting that the government's statistical system for reporting on the economy was
not designed for an information era and therefore misses vital contributions from "software to
financial services to communications" from companies such as "Microsoft, Fidelity and MCI");
Michael J. Mandel, The Digital Juggernaut, BUS. WK., June 6, 1994 (THE INFORMATION
REVOLUTION), at 22 [hereinafter Mandel, Digital Juggernaut] (discussing the "information
economy" of the 1990s).
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secrets, long a part of the larger legal regime protecting intellectual property, play
a more pivotal role. However, they continue to be the only form of intellectual
property not subject to federal legislation.2 Intellectual property laws generally seek
to stimulate economic growth by striking a delicate balance between providing
appropriate incentives for innovation on the one hand3 and promoting competition
and keeping information in the public domain freely accessible to all on the
other 4 The system was historically rooted in federal patent and copyright
protection, with trade secrets law providing a safety net primarily for "lesser and
different" inventions that are unpatentable yet deserving of protection.5 Today,
however, much of the proprietary information and cutting edge intellectual creations
that drive the economy fall outside of the dominant patent and copyright
paradigms, 6 or, at the very least, the scope of protection extended under the
2 The other forms of intellectual property, all subject to federal law, are patents, copyrights,
and trademarks. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (patent law); 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. lI 1997) (CopyrightAct); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 &Supp.
1m 1997) (trademark law).
3 See Rockwell Graphics Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) ('The fixture
of the nation depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry, and the efficiency of the
industry depends in no small part on the protection of intellectual property."); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38-45 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOmC
ANALYSIS] (discussing the economics of intellectual property); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic
Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994) (analyzing how patent law
encourages innovation).
4 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (observing that there is an important
public interest in allowing full and free use of all ideas in the public domain); POSNER, ECONOIC
ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 41 (noting that "the scope [including duration] of intellectual property
rights represents the striking of a balance between the interests of the creators and of the users of
intellectual property"); Wendy J. Gordon, On Own ing Information: Intellectual Property and the
RestitutionaryImpulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149,157-63 (1992) (cautioning against an expansive' reap
only what you have sown" approach to intellectual property because the need to provide incentives
for innovation must be balanced against the countervailing policy of encouraging "dissemination
and use of creations").
5 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,493 (1974) (stating that "trade secret
law encourages the development and exploitation of those items of lesser or different invention
than might be accorded protection under the patent laws, but which items still have an important
part to play in the technological and scientific advancement of the Nation'); Rochelle C. Dreyfuiss,
Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 696
(1986) (noting that trade secret law allows innovators of"'subpatentable inventions' .. . that fall
below the congressional standard for patentability to recoup their costs"). But see J.HL Reichman,
Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2432-38
(1994) (acknowledging that patent and copyright laws play a historic role in protecting intellectual
property rights but arguing that legal theorists have underestimated the significance of trade secrets
law in the intellectual property scheme).
6 See 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1.01, at 1-1 (1985) (observing that
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traditional framework is uncertain.7 The inability of patent and copyright laws to
accommodate abstract information and new forms of innovation is causing
businesses to turn increasingly to trade secrets law for protection.
Trade secrecy, alone among all forms of intellectual property, is not subject to
federal legislation. Therefore, its regulation by the states varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Some states, for example, continue to be guided by the common law
principles set forth in the Restatement (First) of Torts,8 while others have adopted
one of two versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Ac? with various modifications.10
Although state differences may be the norm under federalism, they are less
acceptable when interstate commerce is substantially affected, as in the case of trade
secrets. Also, given American businesses' growing reliance on trade secrecy as a
source of intellectual property protection, the same considerations that prompted
Congress to implement a national policy toward patents and copyrights-ensuring
a proper balance between protection of an innovator's rights and preserving things
and ideas in the public domain in order to foster innovation-should logically
extend to trade secrets. Indeed, in apparent recognition of the increasing significance
of trade secrecy, its interstate and international nature and implications, and the need
for at least a limited coherent national policy on the subject matter,11 Congress
technology has outstripped the traditional intellectual property laws-patents and copyrights). See
generally Reichman, supra note 5 (arguing that new forms ofinnovation are not adaptable to the
traditional patent and copyright paradigms and that a "menu of options" for protection should be
developed instead); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (analyzing why patent and copyright laws
are inappropriate for protecting computer software programs).
7 See infra notes 43-82 and accompanying text.
8 § 757 (1939). Coverage of trade secrets was eliminated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Instead, the subject was added to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §§ 38-45
(1995). The new Restatement provisions are essentially consistent with the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, and, therefore, will not be separately analyzed in this Article. It is unclear whether any of the
states that follow section 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts will eventually adopt the new
Restatement rules. One commentator has observed that courts have ignored the new Restatement
and continue to rely on the original Restatement for defining or interpreting the tort oftrade secret
misappropriation. See Rebel J. Pace, The CaseforA Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARv. JL. &
TECH. 427,430 n.12 (1995); see also Merckle GmbH v. Johnson & Johnson, 961 F. Supp. 721,
730 & n.1 I (D.NJ. 1997) (continuing to rely on the definition of trade secrets found in the
Restatement (First) of Torts although observing that the new Restatement is "relevant, if not
instructive").
9 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) (including both the original version of the Act and the 1985
amendments; additions to the original Act are indicated by underlines and deletions are denoted
by strikeouts).
10 See infra Part IIIA.4.
11 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 11-12, 104th Cong. (1996) (report on the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996)).
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recently enacted the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA),12 which criminalizes
the theft of trade secrets.13 The factors that justified the passage of the EEA should
likewise support a federal civil trade secrets law.
The lack ofuniformity in state trade secrets law also raises vexing choice of law
problems.14 To be sure, that fact alone does not justify federalizing trade secrets
law, since conflicts issues inevitably arise in any suit with multistate involvement 15
However, some features of the modem trade secret misappropriation cause of
action, generally not found in other torts, compound the normal complexities
inherent in any choice of law determination. 16 For example, the ease with which
information can now be misappropriated by electronic means from remote locations
(and transmitted to numerous other locations for use) often makes it extremely
difficult to ascertain where the alleged improper conduct took place or where the
injury occurred-issues that are critical in deciding which state's substantive law
should apply.17
In addition to these domestic considerations, binding obligations under two
well-publicized international trade agreements, to which the United States is a party,
make the case for a federal trade secrets law more compelling.' 8 The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)19 and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),20 which arose out of the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
12 Pub. L. No. 104-359, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1994
& Supp. III 1997)). Although concern about foreign theft of American trade secrets precipitated
passage of the Act, the EEA also applies to domestic trade secret misappropriation. See id. § 1832.
13 Although the EEA allows the Attorney General to bring civil proceedings to enjoin
violations of the Act, it does not authorize private rights of action. See id. §§ 1831-1839.
14 See infra Part mII.C.
15 See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E2d
279 (N.Y. 1963).
16 Ifa former employee uses remote access in Alabama to retrieve information from the
computer network system of the North Carolina office of X Co., and the information was
originally generated in X Co.'s headquarters in California, determining whether to apply the law
of Alabama, North Carolina, or California may be difficult. The problem would be further
complicated.if the former employee also e-mails the information to X Co.'s competitor in
Washington, who then uses the information in its multi-state operations.
17 See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 234-58 and accompanying text.
19 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I..M. 605
[hereinafter NAFTA].
20 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
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(GATr),21 were the first international agreements to deal with trade secrets, 22 and
both set minimum standards for trade secret protection for the signatory nations.23
To the extent that the trade secrets law of some states fail to meet these established
standards, the enactment of a federal law may be necessary to bring the United
States into compliance.
Prior to recent Supreme Court decisions, such as United States v. LopeZ,24 that
limited the powers of Congress, congressional authority to enact a federal trade
secrets law would have been unquestioned. The current Court's less deferential
treatment of congressional acts, however, necessitates an inquiry into the
constitutional bases for such a law. This Article examines the Patent and Copyright
Clause,25 the foreign affairs powers,2 6 and the Commerce Clause27 of the
Constitution and concludes that a federal trade secrets act can clearly be grounded
on the Commerce Clause because of the nexus between trade secrets and interstate
commerce.28 It may also be sustained by Congress's foreign affairs powers since
a federal trade secrets law would enable the United States to fulfill its obligations
under binding international agreements.2 9 The Patent Clause, though, is unlikely to
be a strong source of support because trade secrets are not necessarily original
inventions or discoveries, and an earlier federal trademark law based on the Patent
21 General Agreement on Tariffi and Trade, Oct 30, 1947,61 Stat A-11, T.IAS. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATI].
22 Before NAFTA and TRIPS, no international trade agreement dealt with the issue of trade
secrets. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised by
the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept 9, 1886 (revised in Paris on
July 24, 1971, amended in 1979), S. TREATY DOC. No. 27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
23 See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
24 514 US. 549 (1995).
25 u.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26 The Constitution does not expressly confer foreign relations power to any branch of the
federal government, but that power is assumed to be inherent in national sovereignty. See Perez
v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) ("Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to
Congress of the power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can
be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation."); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("[Tjhe investment of the federal
government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants
of the Constitution. [These powers] exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of
nationality.'); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAMS AND THE U.S. CONsTTrON 16,63-64,70-72
(1996) (discussing Congress's foreign affairs powers),
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28 See infra Part IV.A.3.
29 See infra Part IV.A.2.
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Clause was invalidated by the Supreme Court for precisely that reason.3°
From the perspective of policy, this Article contends that federalizing trade
secrets law, in addition to producing many benefits, will not unduly frustrate the
values usually associated with federalism.31 Thus, despite the current political trend
towards "new federalism," 32 the enactment of a federal trade secrets law to regulate
the only form of intellectual property currently not federally protected is justified
as a matter of policy.
Part II discusses the growing prominence of trade secrecy in an information
economy, which is caused in part by the perceived failure of the dominant
intellectual property models (patent and copyright) to adequately protect much of
today's intellectual property rights. Part 1H makes the case for a federal civil trade
secrets law. It discusses the lack of uniformity in the existing body of law by setting
forth the material differences between the Restatement of Torts approach to trade
secrets and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and between the UTSA and the
various states' versions of it Next, the Article discusses the impact of trade secrets
law on interstate commerce and analyzes the unique choice of law issues in modem
trade secret misappropriation cases. The section also reviews the United States'
international obligations with respect to trade secret protection and argues that the
United States can best meet these obligations with a federal trade secrets law. Part
IV addresses federalism issues and concludes that both the Constitution and public
policy support federal legislation in the area. Finally, Part V briefly highlights the
scope of the federal trade secrets law that this Article envisions.
II. THE GROWING PROMINENCE OF TRADE SECRETS LAW IN A HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION ECONOMY
Innovation is key to a dynamic economy and to the economic well-being of any
developed country.3 3 One generally recognized purpose of the intellectual property
30 See infra Part IV.A.l.
3 1 See infra Part IV.B.
32 
"New federalism" refers to the political doctrine advocating radical downsizing of the
federal government and the return of power to the states. It is a theme, first popularized by the
Reagan administration, that the Republican majority in Congress espouses. See DAVID B.
WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM, SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON 151-62 (1995)
(describing Reagan's 'New Federalism" initiatives); CONTRACr WrHAMERICA, THEBOLD PLAN
BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANs TO CHANGE THE
NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (proposing restoring state authority over
welfare and mandates); E.J. Dionne, Jr., The New, New, New Federalism, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
1995, at A17 (asserting that the call for greaterpowers for the state is based more on tactical than
on principled reasons).
33 See Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 692 (1846) ("All enlightened govenments
reward the inventer [sic] .... Such results not only enrich a nation, but render it illustrious.');
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regime is to provide economic incentives for innovation,34 while balancing the
countervailing public interest in promoting competition and the free flow and
exploitation of information.3 5 Incentives are considered necessary because
innovations36 are usually costly to develop, especially when the risks of failure are
taken into account.37 Additionally, because innovations are intangible, they are
susceptible to being copied by anyone, including those who have not borne any of
the associated costs or risks.38 Without some legal protection, the innovator will
Hearing of the Senate Comm. on Intelligence and Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on
Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, Economic Espionage, Feb. 28, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Senate Comm. Hearing on EEA]
(statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, asserting that intellectual
property "is essential to maintaining the health and competitiveness of critical segments of the
American economy" and that safeguarding industry's trade secrets is "wan-anted and necessary);
S. REP. No. 104-359, at 5-6 (1996) (stating that it is "documented that proprietary economic
information is vital to the prosperity of the American economy," and that "anation's power is now
determined as much by economic strength as by armed might').
34 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984)
(stating that the purpose of patent and copyright laws is to promote creative activity on the part of
authors and inventors); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,485 (1974) ('Trade secret
law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the
independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention.");
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (stating that copyright protection is intended to
motivate artistic and intellectual creation); see also supra note 3.
35 See supra note 4.
36 For the purposes of this Article, the term "innovation" is used in the broadest sense to
mean developing or producing any new information, knowledge, idea, method, process, device,
or thing not commonly known in the industry, as contrasted with imitating existing ideas or things.
37 See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Ser,., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir.
1992) (Kozinski, J.) (stating that giving inventors the "right to reap the benefits of their efforts
compensates them for the costs of innovation, the risk of failure and the potential liability that can
arise if the product proves defective").
38 Intellectual property is often characterized as a "public good." A public good is something
that is not depleted by use and can be held by more than one person at a time. It can be taken from
the owner by others at minimal cost. See Stephen L. Carter, Owning What Doesn 't Exist, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 102 (1990) (noting that public goods are "subject to non-rivalrous
consumption, in the sense that one user's use of the idea does not reduce the value of the idea to
another who wishes to use it," and they can be taken by others "at a cost close to zero"); Wendy
J. Gordon, Fair UseAs Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case
and Its Predecessors, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 1600, 1610-11 (1982) (discussing the public-good
characteristics of intellectual property); Linda J. Lacey, OfBread andRoses and Copyrights, 1989
DuKELJ. 1532,1554 (describing public goods as "those whose consumption by individual A does
not preclude consumption by B, C, D, and others") (quoting John Cirace, When does Complete
Copying of Copyrighted Worksfor Purposes Other than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use?
An Economic Analysis ofthe Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. Louis U. LJ.
647 (1984)); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
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inevitably lose to the second comer in a purely free market since the second comer,
with lower costs, can charge lower prices. In the long run, absent some legal
mechanism barring another's unauthorized use of an innovator's ideas and
creations, innovation will languish because there will be little incentive on the part
of anyone to create.39
At the same time, the intellectual property system recognizes that over-
protection may actually impede innovation by depriving competitors (and users) of
too much information that may be needed as building blocks for further progress.
The drafters of the Constitution apparently decided that a national uniform policy
on intellectual property would be necessary to maintain a careful balance between
these two competing interests, for they expressly included the promotion of "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts" in the enumerated powers granted Congress
under the Constitution.40 Pursuant to that enumerated power, the First Congress
promptly enacted the country's first patent and copyright laws.41
The patent law reflects society's "bargain" with inventors; it affirmatively
grants them, for a limited period of time, an absolute and exclusive right to use or
otherwise benefit from their inventions (meeting certain standards) 42 in exchange
for full disclosure of the invention so that the public would have free access to it43
upon the expiration of the inventor's "monopoly." Because of the considerable
rights conferred on a patent owner at the expense of free competition, the patent law
sets demanding standards. For example, only inventions fitting within one of several
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) ("A distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property is its
'public good' aspect!"). In other words, there are no natural barriers precluding those who have not
paid for a public good from gaining access to it, thus causing a failure in the free market system.
39 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Asymme c Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853 (1992) (asserting that intellectual property law
is needed if, absent such protection, the prisoner's dilemma--or market failure--exists, creating
a disincentive to innovate).
40 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
41 See Act ofApr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (first patent law) (repealed 1793); Act ofMay
31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (first copyright law) (repealed 1802). The current patent and copyright
statutes can be found in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. H 1996) and 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 &
Supp. Ell 1997), respectively.
42 The Patent Act provides that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore," which would provide the grantee a right "to exclude others from
making, using or selling the invention throughout the United States" for a period of 20 years from
the date of application for the patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 154 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
43 Seeid. § 112.
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designated subject matters44 and meeting narrowly defined standards of novelty45
and nonobviousness 46 are patentable. To ensure that these stringent standards are
met, each patent application is subjected to a long and arduous administrative
review.47 Innovations that fail to satisfy these requirements, such as incremental
innovations or business data that companies routinely develop, are unpatentable, no
matter how costly or painstaking the process of producing the innovation, or of
analyzing or synthesizing the information. In effect, the patent scheme gives
inventors of certain "worthy" innovations lead time during which they are free from
competition to enable them to recoup their costs and profit from their efforts. In
return, the public receives the benefit of the inventor's new discoveries for later use.
The Copyright Act, like the patent law, also seeks to encourage creativity
through a limited grant of exclusivity48 to the creator in exchange for obtaining full
and free access to the creator's work upon the termination ofthe copyright The Act
protects the expressions of ideas,4 9 such as a book or painting, but not the ideas
themselves.5 0 Consequently, innovations that are valuable not so much for their
form of expression as for the ideas underpinning them, such as a unique business
44 The protected subject areas are "process, machine, manufacture, or composition ofmatter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof." Id. § 101. Case law has found mathematical
algorithms, abstract ideas, and laws of nature to be unpatentable. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (requiring that an invention not be "known or used by others
in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent").
46 See id. § 103 (providing that an invention is obvious, and hence unpatentable, if the
"subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains").
47 Seeid. § 131.
48 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. m 1997) (giving the author the exclusive right to
reproduce, adapt; distribute, and display her work); id. § 302 (providing that the term of protection
for authors or joint authors is the author's (or surviving joint author's) life plus fifty years; in cases
of works for hire that are owned by a corporate entity, the term is 75 years from the date of
publication or 100 years from the date of creation, whichever expires first).
49 See id. § 102(a) (protecting the author of "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression").
50 See id.; see also Sid & Maty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) ("It is an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a
copyrighted work extends only to the particular expression of the idea and never to the idea
itself.').
The Copyright Act also does not protect any "procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept; principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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plan, are not copyrightable. 51
Innovations that are neither patentable nor copyrightable are not, however,
completely without protection. Historically, state law has safeguarded trade secrets
against misappropriation.52 Although there is no single definition of the term "trade
secret" or "misappropriation," trade secrets law fundamentally proscribes taking
from another, through "improper means," an item of information that has value, so
long as the possessor of the information has taken reasonable measures to guard its
secrecy.53 The element of "improper means" in trade secrecy reflects its goal of
promoting commercial morality, in addition to encouraging innovation;54 and the
condition of secrecy ensures that protection, consistent with the policy underlying
patent laws, would not apply to information already in the public domain.
Trade secrecy is generally considered less of a derogation from the norms of
free competition than patents and copyrights in that it does not involve the granting
of any exclusive rights to the trade secret holder.55 For example, the law does not
51 Besides patents and copyrights, another federal source of intellectual property protection
is found in the trademark laws, known as the Lanham Act The Lanham Act protects a registered
mark, used to identify a trademark owner's goods or services, against another's unauthorized use
if the second use is likely to confuse consumers about the origin of the goods. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1114,1051-1127 (1994). The Act is intended to encourage the production of quality goods and
services by ensuring that the goodwill associated with a trademark (generated as a result of the
quality goods and services sold under the mark) will inure only to the benefit of the trademark
owner, who created the goodwill, and not to others. Because there is little orno overlap between
trade secrets and trademarks, analysis of substantive provisions of the Lanham Act is outside the
scope of this Article.
52 See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (observing that
trade secrets law assures that "the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite
patentable" inventions) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,485 (1974));
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493 ('Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of
those items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent
laws, but which items still have an important part to play in the technological and scientific
advancement of the Nation"); Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88, 97 (1889) (stating, in this first U.S.
Supreme Court case involving trade secrets, that a trade secret agreement between the parties was
valid because "[tjhe policy of the law is to encourage useful discoveries by securing their fruits to
those who make them").
53 See infra Part IIlA.1 to A.2.
54 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481-83 (stating that state trade secrets and federal patent
laws are unlikely to conflict because both serve the similar policy of encouraging innovation;
additionally, trade secrets law is intended to maintain business ethics and promote fair dealing).
55 See id. at 489-90 (observing that "[tirade secret law provides far weaker protection in
many respects than the patent law" in that it does not forbid independent discovery, reverse
engineering, or the discovery of the trade secret by otherwise honest means, while "patent law
operates 'against the world"'); see also 2 JAGER, supra note 6, § 11.01 (comparing the attributes
of trade secret and patent protection).
In a sense, however, trade secrecy can be potentially more restrictive of competition than
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prohibit deriving another's secret through independent discovery,56 or reverse
engineering;5 7 it merely protects against the taking of the rightful possessor's secret
by improper means, 58 which include, for example, "breach of faith" or using
"reprehensible means."59 For that reason, although trade secrets law is also available
for patentable or copyrightable creations, 60 innovators with these types of works
have often opted for the stronger federal protections.61 Thus, state trade secrets law
was historically less significant in the intellectual property scheme and its
inconsistency of less consequence. Trade secrecy's secondary role is changing,
however, as the American economy becomes predominately information-based. 62
Today, advanced technologies and the gathering and processing of information are
vital to many businesses and account for a growing share of the national economy.63
patents and copyrights, because a trade secret holder, unlike a patent inventor or copyright author,
is not required to contribute any part of her innovation to society in return for protection.
56 For a discussion of independent discovery as a proper means of obtaining trade secrets,
see American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314,329-30 (7th Cir. 1984); Texas Urethane, Inc.
v. Seacrest Marine Corp., 608 F.2d 136, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1979); Microbiological Research Corp.
v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696-98 (Utah 1981).
57 Reverse engineering describes the process whereby a second comer works backwards
from the innovator's result or product to derive or reconstruct the secret behind the innovation. On
the propriety of acquiring trade secrets through reverse engineering, see S.I. Handling Sys., Inc.
v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1985); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400,
404-06 (9th Cir. 1982); Angell Elevator Lock Co. v. Manning, 205 N.E.2d 245 (Mass. 1965).
58 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETSACr § 1 cmt.,.14 U.L.A. 433,438 (1985) (listing some ofthe
"proper means" of acquisition of trade secrets, which include discoveryby independent invention,
by reverse engineering, by observation of the item in public use, or through published literature).
59 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (noting that trade secret protection,
unlike patents, does not award a monopoly to the owner, but protects 'merely against breach of
faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret").
60 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-91 (concluding that trade secret protection for patentable
inventions is consistent with federal patent policy).
The Coca-Cola formula is the most famous example of a patentable process, which, although
never patented, was successfully protected as a trade secret See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cola-
Cola Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 18,22 (D. Del. 1985).
61 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-91 (asserting that given the weaker protection of trade
secrets law, few inventors with patentable inventions are likely to "sit back [and] rely on trade
secret law'). But see David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. OF
ECON. PERSP. 61,62-64 (1991) (disagreeing with the notion that rational inventors with patentable
innovations will necessarily seek patent protection and arguing that they will choose trade secret
protection if patent protection "is too costly relative to the value of their invention" or gives them
"a reward substantially less than the benefit of their invention").
62 See 1 JAGER, supra note 6, §§ 1.01, 1.02.
63 See Mandel, Digital Juggernaut, supra note 1, at 23 (reporting that domestic sales of
computers and other information goods and services are high, and the United States also runs a
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Because the patent and copyright laws do not reach these emerging technologies,
businesses are increasingly turning to trade secrecy for protection.64 Nowhere is this
more evident than in the computer software industry,65 which happens to generate
the largest trade surplus of any U.S. industry for the American economy.66
The patent paradigm is often considered a poor fit with software for several
reasons. First, although the courts have finally decided, after years of vacillation,
that software programs are patentable, 67 they have maintained that mathematical
algorithms are unpatentable.68 In other words, to be patentable, a program must be
determined to contain not only mathematical algorithms but an implementation of
those algorithms.69 Given that algorithms routinely underlie computer programs,
whether this criterion has been satisfied is inevitably an open question in every
software patent application. Second, modem software programs often embody a few
huge trade surplus in the area); see also S. REP. No. 104-359, at 6-7 (1996) (commenting on the
growing importance of proprietary economic information to American industry and to the national
economy); H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 4021, 4022
(noting that "[t]he United States produces the vast majority of the intellectual property in the
world" and that 'Intangible assets have become more and more important to the prosperity of
companies").
64 See 1 JAGmE supranote 6, § 1.01.
65 See, e.g., Victoria A. Cundiff, Protecting Computer Sofiware As A Trade Secret, 444
PLI/PAT 7, 11-18 (June 17, 1996) (discussing the deficiencies of the patent and copyright laws in
protecting computer software); Samuelson et a., supra note 6, at 2343-48,2437-56 (discussing
why patent and copyright laws are ill-suited to protecting computer software programs).
66 See World--Computer/IT Software/Services FY99--M1981113 (Best Market Reports,
U.S. Dep't of Comm., Int'l Trade Admin.), available at <http:www.stat-usa.gov> (Globus &
NTDB link). American companies supply 60% of the computer software market in Western
Europe and 73% in the rest of the world, mostly Asia and Latin America. See id; see also Mandel,
Digital Juggernaut, supra note 1 (reporting that the U.S. has a $3 billion trade surplus in
computer-related services and that, in 1993, its international sales of informational-technology
equipment totaled $62 billion).
67 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981) (holding arubber curingprocess that
included a computer program patentable). For a discussion of the case law development of patent
protection for computer software, see David W. Carstens, Legal Protection of Computer Sofiware:
Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 13, 20-37 (1994); Gustavo Siller, Jr.
& Jonathan E. Retsky, Patent and Trade Secret Protection of Computer Technology, 6 SOFrVARE
L.J. 239,246-53.
6 8 See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185-87 (reaffirming the unpatentability of pure mathematical
algorithms, although holding the software program in question patentable); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978) (holding mathematical algorithms unpatentable); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (same).
69 See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185-87; In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir.
1989); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
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generic programs that are integrated in a new way.70 Because of the demanding
requirement of novelty, these types of programs may not be sufficiently novel to be
patentable, despite their commercial value.71 A related problem is that software
innovations are typically incremental in nature and may not meet the "novel" and
"nonobvious" condition of patent law.72 Third, apart from subject matter concerns,
the long application process73 may render patent protection useless for the many
software programs with short life spans. Finally, patents may be of limited use
because a program is principally valued for its result, but patents are typically
granted for specific methods of achieving a result, not the result itself.74 A patent
will not preclude others from producing a program functionally similar to the
innovator's using a different method.7 5
As to copyrights for computer software, the law is also fraught with
uncertainty.76 Copyrights extend only to the expression of ideas, whatever
expression is finally determined to mean, but not to the ideas or processes
themselves.77 In the context of computer software, the copyright law will protect
program "code" (or text) but not program "behavior" (or functionality), which is the
main source of value in a program.78 Because different codes can yield the same
70 See Ester C. Roditti, The Choice Between Patents and Trade Secrets To Protect Software
Innovation, 479 PLI/PAT 701,720 (May 7, 1997).
71 In contrast, novelty and inventions are not necessary elements of the trade secret doctrine,
and therefore these programs may be protectable as trade secrets. See, e.g., Rivendell Forest Prods.
Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042,1044 (10th Cir. 1994); Integrated Cash Management
Servs. Inc. v. Digital Transactions Inc., 920 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1990); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc.
v. Bryan, 784 F. Supp. 982 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
72 See Samuelson et aL., supra note 6, at 2346.
73 See, e.g., 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 1.01, at 1-1 (noting that an advantage of trade secret
over patent protection is that the former involves "no bureaucratic delays and no multiyear waits");
Siller & Retsky, supra note 67, at 243 (explaining that with the Patent Office's backlog of cases,
the review process of an application with no significant complications can still take one to two
years from the date of filing).
74 See Samuelson et al., supra note 6, at 2345.
75 See id.
76 The 1978 Copyright Act was silent on the copyrightability of computer software, but
Congress eventually amended § 117 of the Copyright Act, through the enactment of the Software
Copyright Act of 1980, to explicitly extend copyright protection to software. Even so, the scope
of copyright protection for software remains uncertain. See Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secret
law-Contracts-Misappropriation: Are They Preempted?, 453 PLIIPAT 61 (1996) (discussing
why copyright law is not ideal for protecting computer software programs); Samuelson et al.,
supra note 6, at 2347-56 (same).
77 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(b), 102 (1994 & Supp. I 1997); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992) (reaffirming idea/expression dichotomy).
78 See Samuelson et al., supra note 6, at 2318 (explaining that consumers buy a program for
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function,79 a software engineer can duplicate the behavior of another's program
through the use of code "sufficiently dissimilar on the level of expression [with the
first program] to defeat liability for copyright infringement" 80 Further contributing
to the uncertainty of copyright protection, some expressions in software programs
have been held uncopyrightable because they were deemed dictated by the
computer hardware or other software with which they had to be integrated. 81 The
ambiguity of these rulings makes it even more difficult to predict when a program
will be deemed sufficiently similar in expression to another to constitute copyright
infringement. For these reasons, at least for non-mass-marketed programs licensed
to users through negotiated agreements,82 many software developers now rely on
its function, not for its program "code").
79 See id. at 2345.
80 Comprehensive Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F3d 730,736 n.7 (4th Cir.),
judgment vacated on agreement of the parties, No. 92-1837, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28601 (4th
Cir. Sept. 30, 1993).
81 See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815-18 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding that some expressions of the processes embodied in the program code are
uncopyrightable), aff'dper curiam, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Computer Assocs. v. Altai, 982 F.2d at
706-12 (holding that elements dictated by efficiency or by computer hardware or software with
which the new program must be integrated are uncopyrightable); Cundiff, supra note 65, at 14-15
(same).
82 Software is first created in "source code," which is language readily understood by
software engineers. It is then translated by a machine "compiler" into machine-readable-only
language known as "object code" Software programs are sold or licensed with the object code,
but not the source code, which is kept secret by the software developer. Even if copyright
protection is sought, the law requires only a small portion of the source code to be filed with the
Copyright Office; the remainder may be kept secret. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(2)
(1998). Although the object code can be "decompiled" or reverse engineered to recreate the source
code which is readable by humans, the task is difficult and time consuming. Thus, courts have
concluded that public and unrestricted disclosure of an object code, through sale or license of a
program, does not compromise the secrecy of the program so long as secrecy of the source code
is maintained. To obtain trade secret protection for software licensed to specific users, developers
can use restrictive disclosure agreements effectively banning reverse engineering. Such
agreements, individually negotiated between the parties, are likely enforceable. See Universal Gym
Equip., Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equip. Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (upholding,
against a claim of preemption under patent law, a contract prohibiting a licensee from using any
feature or design of a machine upon termination of the license). Trade secret protection for mass-
marketed software is, however, more problematic. Software developers often try to unilaterally
impose use restrictions, including bans on reverse engineering, on buyers of the software through
"shrinkwrap" licenses, which are visible only when one opens the package. It is unclear whether
shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable, although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
they are. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 2 JAGER,
supra note 6, §§ 9.03, 9.04[1],[2] (discussing source codes, object codes, licensing agreements and
"shrinkwrap licenses").
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trade secret protection, in combination with or in lieu of copyright.83
Another factor behind the growing use of trade secrets law in recent years is the
increased vulnerability of trade secrets in an electronic age.84 Trade secrets are more
susceptible to misappropriation today because of remarkable advances in
telecommunications and other technologies, as well as increased employee
mobility.85 Electronic media such as e-mail and the internet have made the
surreptitious, and instantaneous, transfer of valuable information across state and
even national lines almost effortless. 86 Information from corporate data bases on
83 See Rivendell Forest Prod., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994)
(relying on trade secret protection for a computer software system developed to provide immediate
answers on all aspects of customers' needs); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F2d 655
(4th Cir. 1993) (successfully claiming trade secret protection for a computer program written to
perform survey calculations for the construction of subway tunnels); Integrated Cash Management
Servs., Inc. v. Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1990) (winning an injunction on
a trade secret claim for a computer program that combined non-secret utility programs arranged
in a way not generally known); see also 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 9.02[2], at 9-4 (claiming that
"trade secrets are by far the most commonly used method for protecting software"); Cundiff, supra
note 65, at 11-12 (stating that software developers and owners should "consider using trade secret
safeguards, whether alone or in combination with other legal regimes"); Gale R. Peterson, Trade
Secrets in an Information Age, 32 HOus. L. REv. 385, 386 (1995); Siller & Retsky, supra note 67,
at 244.
84 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 6 (1996) (observing that information is a "prime target" for
misappropriation because it is expensive to develop and computer technology has made it easy to
misappropriate); H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4-5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,
4022-24 (same).
85 See I JAGER, supra note 6, § 1.03, at 1-8 (observing that extremely valuable ideas can be
"embodied in compact and easily transportable form, and espionage techniques are highly
sophisticated"); Michael J. Hutter, Protecting Trade Secrets, 269 PLI/PAT 9, 11 (1989) (stating that
the explosion of trade secret misappropriation in the 1980s is attributable in part to increased
employee mobility and declining morals).
86 The well-publicized and recently settled trade secret misappropriation case involving
General Motors and Volkswagen, for example, well illustrates the revolutionary ease with which
trade secrets may now be misappropriated. A former senior executive of General Motors defected
to Volkswagen with voluminous amounts of proprietary information belonging to GM. He
allegedly accomplished his deed by transferring the information (90,000 text file pages) from the
United States to Germany via GM's internal computer networks and then downloading the
information from GM's network in Germany to Volkswagen's computer system in Germany, all
with apparent ease. See Gabriella Stem & Brandon Mitchener, VWAgrees to Give GM $100
Million To Settle Lopez Trade Secret Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997, at A3 (reporting the
parties' settlement ofthe case, with Volkswagen agreeing to pay GM $100 million and to buy $1
billion in parts from GM over seven years); see also Melvin F. Jager & William J. Cook, Trade
Secrets and Industrial Espionage: Online Piracy, 11 No. 1 WHrE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 3 (Jan.
1997); Edmund L. Andrews, International Business: None Prove So Stubborn As A Giant
Spurned; G.M. Never Wavered in Its 4-Year Fight Over Executive Wo Defected to VJ, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1997, at 37.
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computer systems can be accessed via modem from remote locations, even
internationally. 87 Moreover, large amounts of information can be compactly packed
into disks for easy transportation. Although no comprehensive data has been
collected, accounts of trade secret thefts abound,88 and various limited surveys
support the anecdotal evidence.89 A study conducted by the American Society for
Industrial Security in 1995, for example, found a 323% increase in occurrences of
trade secret misappropriation during the previous two years.90 Another survey,
conducted in 1988, found that 48% of 150 high-technology companies canvassed
had been victims of trade secret misappropriation.91 It is estimated that these thefts
cost American businesses billions of dollars in lost sales annually.92
Regardless of one's views on the current status of federal patent and copyright
laws, the reality is that the inapplicability (or uncertain applicability) of those laws
to many of the new forms of innovations has caused businesses to increasingly look
to trade secrets law for protection.93 With the new prominence of trade secrecy in
87 See Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Crime on Economic
Espionage, 104th Cong. (May 9, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File
[hereinafter House Comm. Hearing on EEA] (statement of Thomas W. Brunner, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce).
88 See Gregory L. Miles, Information Thieves Are Now Corporate Enemy No. 1, BUs. WK.,
May 5, 1986, at 120.
Although most of the cases are eventually settled, plaintiffs have received multimillion dollar
damage awards in a few recent trade secret misappropriation cases. See Vermont Microsystems
Inc. v. Autodesk Inc., No. 2:92-CV-309, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18737 (D. Vt. Dec. 23, 1994)
(awarding plaintiff $25.5 million); Frederick Rose, Rockwell International Plans to Appeal Steep
Award in Celeritas Cellular Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1997, at A4 (reporting award of$115.3
million to plaintiff for patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation).
89 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 7-9 (1996) (summarizing reports showing an increasing
number of trade secret misappropriation incidents and describing some of those incidents).
90 See RiCHARD HEFFERNAN & DAN SMARTwOOD, TRENDS IN INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY
Loss SURvEY 4 (1996), cited in S. REP. No. 104-359, at 8 (1996).
9 1 See Lois F. Mock & Dennis Rosenbaum, A Study of Trade Secrets Theft in High-
Technology Industries, in NATIONAL INS-rruTE OF JUSTICEDIsCUSsION PAPER 6 (1988), cited in
S. REP. No. 104-359, at 8 (1996).
92 See Miles, supra note 88, at 120; Senate Comm. Hearing on EEA, supra note 33
(statement of FBI Director Freeh); Hutter, supra note 85, at 11 (citing Corporate Cloak and
Dagger, TIME, Aug. 20, 1982, at 62-63).
93 Some commentators contend that the inability of the patent and copyright laws to reach
some of the emerging technologies is a deficiency that should be rectified by a broadening of the
federal laws to adapt to these modem forms of innovations. Others, however, support the
"limitations" of the patent and copyright laws as appropriate. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 5
(arguing that new forms of innovation are not adaptable to the traditional patent and copyright
paradigms and that a "menu of options" for protection should be developed); Stephen Fraser,
Canada-United States Trade Issues: Back From Purgatory? Why Computer Software "Shrink-
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the intellectual property system in the 1990s, a uniform national policy seems as
warranted for trade secrecy today as for the other major forms of intellectual
property-patents and copyrights.
1H. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL TRADE SECRETS LAW
A. The Lack of Uniformity in State Trade Secrets Law
Trade secrets law, borrowing concepts from old English cases, developed
haphazardly in the early years in the United States.94 The Restatement (First) of
Torts, which made the first attempt to articulate the general principles of the law,95
managed to coalesce the various common law concepts but fell short of leading the
states to a uniform law.96
A second effort at harmony was made in 1979, when the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA) and recommended its adoption by the states.97 The Act was subsequently
amended in 1985 to clarify ambiguous provisions and to strengthen its remedial
framework.98 However, unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, the UTSA never
Wrap" Licenses Should be Laid to Rest, 6 TUL J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 193 (1998) (arguing that
"the limitations to the copyright protection of computer software were legislated by
Congress... for the protection of users of the programs"). It is not the purpose of this Article to
enter into this debate. Rather, it is important to observe that irrespective of one's position on this
issue, the fact remains that trade secrecy has assumed a more dominant role in the intellectual
property system because the new forms of innovation do not fall neatly within the traditionally
dominant patent and copyright parameters. As trade secrecy moves away from its role as merely
a secondary source of intellectual property protection for "lesser" inventions, the problems arising
from the lack of uniformity in the state laws become less acceptable.
94 The trade secret misappropriation cause of action originated in the English common law.
See, e.g., Morison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851); Yovatt v. Winyard, 37 Eng. Rep. 425
(1820); Williams v. Williams, 36Eng. Rep. 61 (1817). See generally 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 2.01
(discussing the development of trade secrets law from early English common law to its current
form in this country). It was brought into this country in a series of mid-nineteenth century cases.
See, e.g., Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868); Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. 370 (1866);
Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837); Hammer v. Barnes, 26 How. Pr. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1863); Jarvis v. Peck, 10 Paige Ch. 118 (N.Y. Ch. 1843).
95 See § 757.
96 See infra part II.A.1.
97 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UTSA), prefatory note, 14 U.LA. 433, 435-36 (1985)
(describing the history of the drafting of the UTSA).
98 Compare the original and the amended versions of UTSA §§ 2,3, 7 & 11, 14 U.LA. at
449-467 (containing both versions; language added in the 1985 amendments is denoted by
underlines while text in the original Act deleted in 1985 is indicated by strikeouts). See James C.
Lydon, The Deterrent Effect of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
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won the support of all of the states,99 and even the states that did adopt the UTSA
modified it, sometimes substantially, before enactment. 100 Consequently, despite
the UTSA, the law on trade secret misappropriation continues to vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
More recently, a section on trade secrets, largely consistent with the UTSA, was
included in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. 10 However, there is no
indication yet that the jurisdictions that have so far resisted the UTSA have now
abandoned the old Restatement in favor of the new Restatement principles.'0 2 In
fact, one commentator has observed that courts have mainly ignored the new
Restatement and are continuing to rely on the original Restatement definitions and
interpretations. 03
This section will begin with a brief discussion of section 757 of the Restatement
(First) of Torts and of the UTSA, which will set the stage for an analysis of the
material differences between the two models and of the significant modifications
made to the UTSA by the adopting states. It will not separately analyze the trade
secrets provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition because they
essentially conform to the UTSA.' 04
Soc'Y 427,43-40 (1987) (discussing the differences between the original UTSA and the amended
UTSA). Unless otherwise specified, subsequent references in this Article to the UTSA are to
provisions that are identical in both versions of the Act, and will be cited simply as UTSA §
[section number] for simplicity.
99 Eight states have chosen not to adopt the UTSA: Massachusetts, Michigan, New York
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. Massachusetts has its own trade
secret statute, which is not based on the UTSA. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 42-42A (Law.
Co-op. 1994). The other seven non-UTSA states have no statutory trade secrets law and continue
to rely on the principles set forth in section 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts for guidance.
100 Although forty-two states have enacted the UTSA in one form or another, their statutes
are modeled on different versions of the Act, and most include various modifications. In fact, the
trade secrets statutes of North Carolina and Alabama depart so substantially fi-om the UTSA that
they can hardly be considered enactments of the UTSA. Even as to identical elements in the states'
statutes, interpretational differences remain. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
101 §§ 39-45 (1995). For detailed discussion of the relevant new Restatement provisions, see
I JAGER, supra note 6, § 3.03. The subject matter of trade secrets was excluded from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
102 See, e.g., Merckle GmbH v. Johnson & Johnson, 961 F. Supp. 721,730 & n.11 (D.NJ.
1997) (continuing to rely on the definition of trade secrets found in the Restatement (First) of Torts
although observing, in a footnote, that the new Restatement is "relevant, if not instructive').
103 Pace, supra note 8, at 430 n.12.
104 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the Restatement will be to the
Restatement (First) of Torts.
1650 [Vol. 59:1633
FEDERALLZING TRADE SECRETS LAW
1. The Restatement Principles-Section 757 of the
Restatement (First) of Torts
Fundamentally, the Restatement calls for ascertaining whether a trade secret
exists and, if so, whether it has been misappropriated. 105 A trade secret is defined
as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it."'10 6 As the term implies, "a substantial
element of secrecy" must be present,1 07 and the owner must act reasonably to
preserve the secrecy of the information. 10 8 To determine whether any given
information constitutes a trade secret, the Restatement lists six factors that should
be considered.109
Assuming that a trade secret is shown, the Restatement proscribes another's use
or disclosure of the secret only if it had been acquired through "improper means,"1 10
105 See PSTAe Frst) OFTORTS § 757 (1939). The section provides as follows:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable
to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other
in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret
and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third person's disclosure
of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its disclosure
was made to him by mistake.
Id
106 Id § 757 cmt. b.
107 See id ("The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters ofpublic knowledge
or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret.").
108 See Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 277, 278
(1980).
109 See RESTATEMENT (FsT) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. (1939). The factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to
which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by
him in developing the information; (6) the ease and difficulty with which the information
could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id.
110 Id § 757(a). The Restatement does not define "improper means" but merely states, in its
16511998]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
or if the use or disclosure constitutes a breach of confidence. 11' The Restatement
also extends liability to a third party's use or disclosure of the secret if the third
party had acquired the information from another with notice that it was secret and
that either the information was originally acquired through improper means or the
other's disclosure of the trade secret to her was in breach of confidence. 112 Under
the Restatement, trade secrets are protected even against accidental disclosures if
the defendant had notice that the information disclosed was a trade secret and that
the disclosure to her was accidental.1 13
Despite its contribution, the Restatement did not bring about uniformity, partly
because the Restatement, by its nature, is merely expository, not statutory. Thus,
courts are free to adopt, reject, and interpret it as they see fit.114 The Restatement
comments, that they are "means which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial
morality and reasonable conduct." It cites, as examples of such means, 'Traudulent
misrepresentations to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone wires, eavesdropping or other
espionage." Id. § 757 cmt. f.
111 See id. § 757(b). The Restatement gives a few examples of confidential relationships,
such as the relationship between principal and agent Additionally, the Restatement describes other
situations that may give rise to a duty of confidence, such as the seller's disclosure of a secret to
a prospective buyer solely to enable the prospective buyer to evaluate its value. See id § 757 cmt
i.
112 Seeid. § 757(c).
113 See id. § 757(d).
114 For example, some states approved of the Restatement's limitation that information must
be in "continuous use in the operation of a business" to qualify as a trade secret, while other states
either rejected or overlooked the requirement For cases adopting the Restatement's continuous
use requirement, see, for example, Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285,297-98 (2d Cir.
1986) (suggesting that trade secret status did not extend to cases involving a "single or ephemeral"
use by the trade secret owner); Hurst v. Hughes Tool Co., 634 F.2d 895, 899 (5th. Cir. 1981)
(suggesting that negative know-how does not qualify as a trade secret); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen,
260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 251, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1968) (suggesting that an owner's use of a claimed
trade secret is required for legal protection); Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 N.E. 806, 812 (1.
1921) (stating that the trade secret owner must prove that it was using the secret process);
Kendall/Hunt Publ'g. Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W. 2d 235, 246 (Iowa 1988) (applying the use
requirement to deny protection to an "ephemeral" list ofnames that was constantly changing). For
cases that have rejected the requirement, see, for example, Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky,
214 U.S.P.Q. 272,278 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affidsub nom. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701
F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that Illinois law did not impose an "actual use" requirement on
the owner for the information to qualify as trade secret); Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film
Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1953) (finding no authority in New Jersey law, which
controlled, as requiring plaintiff's use of the secret); Harris Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 157 F. Supp.
779, 787-88 (W.D. Ark. 1957) (finding that the trade secret owner's inability to exploit the trade
secret does not mean that the trade secret claim is abandoned); Prince Mfg., Inc. v. Automatic
Partner, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 450,458 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1976) (rejecting requirement of use by a trade
secret owner).
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has also been faulted for its lack of clarity 15 and its failure to present a coherent
remedial framework or to recommend a statute of limitations. 116 Today, several
states with significant commercial activity, such as New York, Texas, and
Pennsylvania, continue to draw on the principles of trade secrets law articulated in
the Restatement.117
2. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
The UTSA, like the Restatement, requires the existence of a "trade secret' and
its "misappropriation" before liability attaches. 118 Its definition of the term "trade
secret," however, is broader than the Restatement's; it includes:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process that (i) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
Overall, as one court noted, trade secret cases were not "marked by any discemable
consistency" and tended to "vary quite widely." See Robin & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 213
U.S.P.Q. 723,751 (D.N.J. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d424 (3d Cir. 1982).
115 See UTSA (amended 1985) prefatorynote, 14 ULA. 433,434(1990) (noting the"undue
uncertainty concerning the parameters of trade secret protection" and the "confused status" of the
law); Richard Stem, A Reexamination ofPreemption of State Trade Secret Law After Kewanee,
42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 927,937-38 (1974) (arguing that development of trade secrets law under
the Restatement led to inconsistencies as courts relied on different legal theories of recovery,
including express or implied contract, property, unjust enrichment, and tort).
116 See Klitzke, supra note 108, at 283 & n.32-33 (noting that the Restatement is silent on
the statute of limitations for trade secret misappropriation, and its treatment of damages is
inadequate); Stem, supra note 115, at 938 (observing that jurisdictions differed considerably on
the use of injunctions and on the measure of damages).
117 See UTSA, 14 U.L.A. 433, 433 (1985) (Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act has Been
Adopted) (providing a listing of the forty-two states that have enacted some form of the UTSA).
The eight states that have not enacted the UTSA are Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. Of these eight states, Massachusetts has
its own statutory protection for trade secrets, but apparently continues to rely on the Restatement
definitions. See 2 JAGER, supra note 6, Mass.01-Mass.04 &n.34 (citing cases).
118 The original UTSA, adopted in 1979, was amended in 1985 primarily to clarify
ambiguities in the original Act and to strengthen its remedial provisions. The amendments do not
significantly modify the scope or philosophy of the original Act. Compare UTSA §§ 2,3, 7 & 11
(1979), with UTSA (as amended in 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) (material added in 1985 is
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circumstances to maintain its secrecy.119
Unlike the Restatement, the UTSA rejects use by the trade secret owner as a
prerequisite for legal protection. 120
In another departure from the Restatement the UTSA's definition of
misappropriation treats the improper acquisition of a trade secret and its subsequent
use or disclosure as separate bases of action.121 In other words, those who acquire
another's trade secrets through improper means are subject to liability122 even if
they never use or disclose the information so acquired. 123 Similarly, third parties are
liable for their acquisition of a trade secret with actual or constructive knowledge
that the trade secret was originally acquired through improper means, irrespective
of whether they actually use or disclose the acquired information. 124
Treated as a separate category of misappropriation by the UTSA,125 the
unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret is actionable if the information was
119 UTSA § 1(4).
120 See id. § 1 cmt. at 439 (rejecting the Restatement definition of trade secret "which
required that a trade secret be 'continuously used in one's business").
121 See id. § 1(2). Under this section:
"Misappropriation" means:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by
a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to
acquire it;
(11) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy
or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking
relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know it was
a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
Id.
122 Adopting the Restatement approach, the UTSA does not exhaustively define the term
"improper means," but merely sets forth examples of what the term might include: "theft, bribey,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means.'Id. § 1(1).
123 See id. § 1(2)(i).
124 See id.
125 See id. § 1(2)(ii).
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acquired either in the context of a confidential relationship (e.g., employment) 126
or through improper means 127 Disclosure or use by third parties is also actionable
when the third party has actual or constructive notice that the information was secret
and that either its original acquisition was through improper means 128 or that the
information was disclosed to her in breach of confidence.129 Finally, even
accidental acquirers of a trade secret are liable upon their disclosure or use of the
secret if, before materially altering their position, they knew or had reason to know
that the information was secret and that their acquisition was accidental or a
mistake.130
Unlike the Restatement, the UTSA includes a comprehensive remedial
framework 131 and a statute of limitations.132 Actual or threatened misappropriation
may be enjoined, 133 but perpetual injunctions, deemed punitive, are disfavored. 134
Instead, injunctions may last only until good faith competitors learn of the trade
secret through proper means, plus any lead time advantage the misappropriator has
gained.135 "In extreme circumstances," the court may award reasonable royalties,
in effect a compulsory license, in lieu of an injunction. 136 With respect to monetary
126 See id. § 1(2)(ii)(B)(ll).
127 See id. § 1(2)(iiXA).
128 See id. § 1(2)(ii)(B).
129 See id. § 1(2)(ii)(B)(llI).
130 See id. § l(2)(ii)(C).
131 See id. §§ 2-4.
132 See id. § 6.
133 See id. § 2(a). This section states the following:
(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the
court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the
injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate
commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.
(b) If the court determines that it would be unreasonable to prohibit future use, an
injunction may condition fiture use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than
the period of time the use could have been prohibited.
(c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be
compelled by court order.
Id.
134 See id. § 2 cmt.
135 See id. § 2(a).
136 See id. § 2(b). This section states the following:
In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of
a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been
prohibited. Exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and
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relief, both actual damages and unjust enrichment may be recovered. 137 The UTSA
also authorizes punitive damages up to twice the compensatory award in cases of
"willful and malicious misappropriation,"'138 and reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party in egregious situations. 139
In contrast to the Restatement's silence on the statute of limitations, 140 the
UTSA specifically provides for a three-year period, which runs from the date the
misappropriation is discovered or should have been discovered.141 However, a
continuing misappropriation is considered a single claim, not a continuing wrong,
and, therefore, continued wrongful use does not prevent the running of the
statute. 14
2
prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of
misappropriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable.
Id.
The original version of the Act did not include the words 'in exceptional circumstances" or
the explanation of what might constitute exceptional circumstances. See id. § 2(b). Thus, under the
1979 Act, the court had wide discretion in deciding whether to grant an injunction or to award
what amounts to a compulsory license. The 1985 amendments sought to limit the court's discretion
by clarifying that it should choose royalties over an injunction only in exceptional circumstances.
137 See id. §3(a). However, to the extent that any unjust enrichment is taken into account in
computing actual loss, it cannot be added on again in computing unjust enrichment. In other
words, double counting of damages is not permitted. See id
138 Id. § 3(b) ("If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award
exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection (a).").
139 See id. § 4 ("If (i) a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, (ii) a motion to
terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or (iii) willful and malicious
misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attomey's fees to the prevailing party.").
14 Of course, statutes of limitation are, by definition, acts of legislatures rather than the type
of expository statements ofjudicial common law that are normally included in Restatements.
141 See id. § 6 ("An action for misappropriation must be brought within 3 years after the
misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been
discovered .... ).
142 See id. ("For the purposes of this section, a continuing misappropriation constitutes a
single claim. ). But see Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950,953 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (adhering to a continuing wrong approach); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485
F. Supp. 410,426 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (same); McCormack & Dodge Corp. v. ABC Management Sys.,
Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. 432,444 (Wash. Super. CL 1983) (holding that each unauthorized use ofa trade
secret is an independent misappropriation under the Act which starts the running of a new
limitation period).
Another UTSA section that has no counterpart in the Restatement is the UTSA's requirement
that the court protect the secrecy of trade secrets disclosed in litigation, so that the very information
for which protection is sought will not be disclosed in the process of litigation itself. See UTSA
§ 5.
1656 [Vol. 59:1633
FEDERAUiZING TRADE SECRETS LAW
To date, forty two states have enacted the UTSA.143 Modeled on either the
original or the 1985 version,144 these state statutes often include many
modifications. 145 Indeed, the statutory enactments of two states, North Carolina 14 6
and Alabama, 147 deviate so radically from the UTSA that they are hardly
recognizable as adoptions of the uniform act.
143 See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (1993); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910 to 45.50.945
(Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to 44-407 (West 1994); ARK. CODEANN. §§ 4-
75-601 to 4-75-607 (Michie 1991); CAL Civ. CODE §§ 3426 to 3426.11 (West 1997); COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to 7-74-110 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to 35-58 (West 1997);
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (1993); D.C. CODEANN. §§ 48-501 to 48-510 (1997); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 688.001-.009 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODEANN. §§ 10-1-760 to 10-1-
767 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to 482B-9 (1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to 48-807
(1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/1 to 1065/9 (West 1993); IND. CODEANN. §§ 24-2-3-1
to 24-2-3-8 (Michie 1995); IOWA CODEANN. §§ 550.1 to 550.8 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-3320 to 60-3330 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880-.900 (Michie 1996); LA
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431-:1439 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 1541-1548 (West 1997); MD. CODEANN., Com. Law. II §§ 11-1201 to 11-1209 (1990); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 325c.01 to 325c.08 (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19
(1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450-.467 (West 1995); MONT. CODEANN. §§ 30-14-401 to 30-
14-409 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to 87-507 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 600A.010-
.100 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-B:l-B:9 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to 57-
3A-7 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to 66-157 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-
01 to 47-25.1-08 (1993); OHIOREV. CODEANN. §§ 1333.61-.69 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461-.475 (1993); R.I. GE. LAWS §§ 6-41-
1 to 6-41-11 (1992); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 39-8-10 to 39-8-130 (Law. Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODHIED
LAWS §§ 37-29-1 to 37-29-11 (Michie 1994); UTAH CODEANN. §§ 13-24-1 to 13-24-9 (1996);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 523 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to 59.1-343 (Michie 1992);
WASH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 19.108.010-.940 (West 1989); W. VA. CODE§§ 47-22-1 to47-22-10
(1996); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West 1989).
144 States that have adopted the 1979 Act with modifications include Alaska, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, and Washington. Those that
have followed the 1985 model with modifications are Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. A few states
have incorporated portions of both the 1979 and the 1985 versions of the Act, and two states have
almost completely overhauled the UTSA. See Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States'Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 51-52 (1990).
14 5 For a detailed discussion of the different states' modifications of the UTSA, see id.; 1
JAGER, supra note 6, § 3.05[3].
14 6 See Joseph E. Root & Guy M. Blynn, Abandonment of Common-Law Principles: The
North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823 (1982).
147 See Thad G. Long, The Alabama Trade Secrets Act, 18 CuMB. L. REV. 557 (1987).
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3. Material Differences Between the Restatement and the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Because several significant commercial states have chosen to continue to rely
on the Restatement rather than enact the UTSA, it is important to examine the
material differences between these models. 148
a. Continuous Use By the Owner
A major distinction between the Restatement and the UTSA is that the former
confers trade secret status only on information that is in continuous use by the
owner in business, while the latter imposes no such condition. 149 Under the
Restatement, a trade secret is defined as "information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it," and as "a process or device for continuous
use in the operation of the business." 150 This restrictive definition effectively denies
trade secret protection for information relating to "single or ephemeral" events that
are nonetheless valuable and secret, such as the terms of secret bids and impending
business announcements. 151 It also leaves unprotected secret information that an
148 For a detailed comparison of the UTSA and Restatement provisions, see Klitzke, supra
note 108.
14 9 Other differences in the Restatement's and the UTSA's definitions of the term "trade
secret"include the UTSA's addition of "information," "program, "method," and "technique to
the list of what might constitute a trade secret Comments to the Restatement explain that'method"
and "technique" were included to clarify that "know-how" fits within the definition. See UTSA
§ I cmt., 14 U.LA. 433,439 (1985).
150 RESTATMENT (FrT) OFTORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (emphasis added).
151 See, e.g., Hudson Hotels Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, 995 F.2d 1173, 1177 (2d Cir.
1993) (finding that a new concept must be used continuously in commerce to be protectable as a
trade secret); Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 298 (2d Cir. 1986) (denying protection
because of a lack of continuing use of the secret by the owner); Richter v. Westlab, Inc., 529 F.2d
896,900(6th Cir. 1976) (denying trade secret protection to a marketing concept or new production
idea because it did not create a continuing competitive advantage but merely a temporary
advantage that would disappear once the idea is implemented); Kendall/Hunt Publ'g. Co. v. Rowe,
424 N.W.2d 235, 246 (Iowa 1988) (denying trade secret protection for an "ephemeral" list of
names); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 329 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Wis. 1983)
(emphasizing the "continuous use" requirement in narrowly interpreting the term "trade secret"
in a criminal statute).
This limitation does not mean, however, that information not continuously used by the owner
is completely unprotected by law. Section 759 of the Restatement (First) of Torts provides that
"[o]ne who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business interest, procures by improper means
information about another's business is liable to the other for the harm caused by his possession,
disclosure or use of the information." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (1939). However,
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innovator has not had an opportunity to exploit,152 as well as negative information,
i.e. information about what not to do. 153
The UTSA rejects the Restatement's continuous use requirement and explicitly
extends trade secret protection to information (of actual or potential economic
value) that the owner has not yet used or that is valuable only from a negative
perspective. 154 The difference between the Restatement's and the UTSA's treatment
of negative know-how is particularly significant in a complex economy because
information derived from painstaking research about what is infeasible or inefficient
could well prove as advantageous to a business as positive information.
b. Wrongful Acquisition and Subsequent Use or Disclosure
Another important distinction between the Restatement and the UTSA is that
a defendant's improper acquisition of a trade secret, absent subsequent use or
disclosure, is independently actionable under the UTSA but not under the
Restatement.155 In the notable case of Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek,156 a
the protection afforded such information under section 759 is more limited than the broader
protection for trade secrets under section 757 of the Restatement See Edmund W. Kitch, The
Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of Management Employees: A New
Problem For the Law, 47 S.C. L. REv. 659, 661-62 (1996) (explaining § 759 and comparing it
with the more expansive § 757).
152 See UTSA § 1 crt (noting that in removing the "continuous use" requirement, the
UTSA "extends protection to a plaintiffwho has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means
to put a trade secret to use").
153 See Hurst v. Hughes Tool Co., 634 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1981) (denying plaintiff's
trade secret misappropriation claim partly because the information claimed to be a trade secret
provided only "what not to do" input to the company); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F.
Supp. 254, 260 n.6 (E.D. La. 1967) (expressing doubt that negative information is protectable).
154 See UTSA, § 1 cmt. (eliminating the "use" condition to protect information that a trade
secret owner has not yet had an opportunity to use and protecting "information that has
commercial value from a negative viewpoint for example the results of lengthy and expensive
research which proves that a certain process will not work"). See, ag., Gillis Assoc. Indus. v. Car-
All, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 881, 884 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (using the trade secret definition found in the
UTSA as adopted by Illinois); Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 585 (Md. Ct. App.
1991) (stating that the Maryland statute's definition of trade secret is broader than that of the
Restatement); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665,674 n.2 (Wash. 1987) (applying the
UTSA definition of trade secret).
The new Restatement provisions on trade secrets, consistent with the UTSA, also reject the
original Restatement's use requirement See RESrATEME'JI(Mum) OF UNFA COMPErrON § 39
& cmt d (1995) ('The definition [of trade secret] adopted in this Section [consistent with the
UTSA] contains no requirement that the information afford a continuous or long-term
advantage.").
155 Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTs § 757 (1939) ("One who discloses or uses
another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if... '"), with UTSA § 1(2)
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defendant had knowingly purchased equipment embodying trade secrets improperly
taken from the plaintiff, but had not yet used the equipment. Because improper
acquisition is not independently actionable under the Restatement, the defendant
escaped liability.' 57 Had the UTSA been applicable, the outcome would have been
different. 158
c. Subsequent Knowledge ofMisappropriation
Under the Restatement, a person who innocently acquires a trade secret and
thereafter learns that the original acquisition was improper (or a mistake) is not
liable even for subsequent use or disclosure if she, in good faith, paid value for the
information or otherwise substantially changed her position prior to her receipt of
notice.159 The UTSA, on the other hand, affords decidedly more protection to the
owner of the trade secret. Under the UTSA, a person who continues to use or
disclose a trade secret after learning of the initial improper acquisition is subject to
liability, even if she paid value for the secret or had substantially changed her
position prior to the receipt of notice.160
("Misappropriation' means: (i) acquisition of a trade secret... by improper means; or (ii)
disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person
who....') (emphasis added). See also RESTAEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 &
cmt. b (1995) (explaining that the Restateinent (First) of Torts imposed liability only for wrongful
use or disclosure of a another's trade secret but not for its independent, improper acquisition, and
stating that § 40 of the new Restatement consistent with the UTSA, changes that rule).
156 790 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
157 See id. at 1205; see also Hurst, 634 Fl.d at 899 (finding, under Texas law, that negative
information did not qualify as a trade secret or, alternatively, that the benefits defendant derived
from it were insufficient use for liability to attach).
158 See Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1989) (stating that improper
acquisition of a trade secret qualifies as a misappropriation); Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v.
Koering, 404 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. App. 1987).
159 See REsrAT&MN, (FIST) OF TORTS § 758(b) (1939).
160 See, e.g., Forest Lab., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that
a defendant who leams of its unauthorized possession of another's trade secret after a period of
innocent use is liable for any subsequent use). The new Restatement on trade secrets is consistent
with the UTSA on this point. See RESTATEMENT (THMD) OF UNFAIR COMPETION § 40(b)(2)-
(bX4) & cmt. d (1995) (stating, without qualification, that once a third party receives the requisite
knowledge, she is subject to liability for subsequent use and disclosure).
However, the fact that an innocent person paid value or substantially changed her position
prior to learning of the improper acquisition has a bearing on whether injunctive remedy is granted.
See UTSA § 2(b) (permitting the court to substitute payment of a reasonable royalty in lieu of
injunctive relief in "exceptional circumstances'); RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPE=TION
§ 40 cmt. d (1995) (stating that "although receipt ofrequisite knowledge is sufficient to subject the
actor to liability for subsequent conduct, the relief available to the trade secret owner may be
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d. Statute ofLimitations
The Restatement makes no recommendation for a limitations period for trade
secret misappropriation, leading states to set their own rules.161 For example, Texas,
a Restatement state, has a two-year limitation period which, its Supreme Court
recently held, begins to run upon the act of misappropriation, not when the
misappropriation was discovered or should have been discovered. 162 In contrast, the
UTSA has a three-year statutory period which begins to run only when the
misappropriation is discovered or should have been discovered. 63
4. Examples of Statutory Variations Among States Adopting the UTSA
Even among states that have adopted the UTSA, variations exist to the extent
that each state's statutory scheme modifies the uniform law.164 In fact, the trade
secret statutes of Alabama and North Carolina differ substantially from the UTSA,
with Alabama providing much less protection 165 and North Carolina more
limited by the equities of the case").
161 It should be noted that Restatements do not, as a general rule, include statutes of
limitation which are, by definition, acts of legislatures and not the type ofjudicial common law that
one expects to be "restated" in Restatements.
162 See ComputerAssocs. Int'l v. Altai Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Tex. 1996) (holding that,
under Texas law, the discovery rule exception tolling the statute of limitations does not apply in
trade secret misappropriation cases); Ian C. Ballon, IntellectualProperty Protection and Related
Third Party Liability, 482 PLI/PAT 559, 630 (June 1997) (noting that the Computer Associates
holding rejected the law in force in 39 other states).
1 6 3 See UTSA § 6.
The UTSA also rejects a line of common law cases that followed the "continuing wrong"
theory, or the notion that each day oftrade secret misuse extends the wrong and starts the running
of a new statutory period. See UTSA § 6 & cmt. ('CThe Act rejects a continuing wrong approach
to the statute of limitations... ."); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 523-24 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that a later unauthorized use of a trade secret does not extend the limitation period).
For examples of cases that followed the continuing wrong theory, see, e.g., Underwater Storage
Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (adhering to a continuing wrong
approach); Anaconda C6. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(stating that the statute of limitations commences to run anew with each wrongful use);
McCormack & Dodge Corp. v. ABC Management Sys., Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. 432, 444 (Wash.
Super. CL 1983) (holding that each unauthorized use of a trade secret is an independent
misappropriation under the Act which starts the running of a new limitation period).
164 One commentator reports that only one state, Rhode Island, has adopted the UTSA (1985
version) without any modification. See Samuels & Johnson, supra note 144, at 52.
165 See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (1993). For a detailed explanation of the Alabama
Trade Secrets Act, see Long, supra note 147.
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protection than the UTSA.166 Below is a discussion of some of the more significant
state variances. 167
a. Definition of Trade Secret
Several states have materially altered the UTSA's definition of trade secret The
Alabama Trade Secrets Act, for example, narrows the definition considerably,
leaving more information unprotected than under the UTSA. Neither Alabama's
statutory requisite of "intention to use the secret in trade or business, ' 168 nor its
requirement that information be "embodied in a formula, pattern, compilation,
computer software, drawing, device, method, technique, or process' 169 has any
counterpart in the UTSA.170 The "intention to use" requirement effectively denies
trade secret status for negative information, while the "embodiment" requirement
disqualifies abstract ideas and information from trade secret status unless they are
reduced to physical form.171
California and Colorado, on the other hand, appear to expand the UTSA's
scope of protection. Under the UTSA, information that is "readily ascertainable by
proper means" would not constitute a trade secret 172 on the theory that such
information could hardly be considered secret. California's trade secret statute
eliminates the "readily ascertainable" language, 173 thereby opening up trade secret
status to even information that is easily ascertained using proper means. Colorado
almost completely rejects the UTSA's definition of trade secret and instead bases
its determination on whether the trade secret owner has "taken measures to prevent
16 6 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to 66-157 (1997). For detailed analysis of the North
Carolina Trade Secrets Act, see Root & Blynn, supra note 146. Additionally, South Carolina
recently replaced its original version of the UTSA with a new version which deviates more
substantially from the UTSA by providing greater trade secret protection. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-9-10 to 39-9-130 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997); Mark V. Thigpen, Note, A NewAge
ofDiscovery: Your Trade Secrets are Safe in South Carolina, 49 S.C. L. REV. 615 (1997); Kirk
T. Bradley, Note, Employees Beware: Employer Rights Under the South Carolina Trade Secrets
Act, 49 S.C. L. REv. 597 (1997).
167 It is not the purpose of this Article to provide a complete catalog of all of the state
changes to the UTSA. For an extended discussion of those modifications, see Samuels & Johnson,
supra note 144; 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 3.05[3].
168 ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(1) (1993).
1 6 9 Id. (emphasis added).
170 See UTSA § 1(4), 14 U.LA. 433, 438 (1985).
171 Another deviation is that the secret must have "significant' economic value under the
Alabama Trade Secret Act, in contrast to the UTSA's mere "independent economic value'
standard. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(1) (1993); UTSA § l(4Xi).
172 See UTSA § 1(4Xi).
173 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426.1(dXl) (West 1997).
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the secret from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the
owner to have access thereto for limited purposes." 174 South Carolina's recently
enacted Trade Secret Act also augments the UTSA's definition of trade secrets by
providing that even "minor or simple" trade secrets can be protected if they,
collectively, "can make a substantial difference" in efficiency or may be the basis
of a business strategy.175
b. Definition ofMisappropriation
Under the Alabama act, there is no recourse whatsoever against a third party
who had no initial notice of an earlier misappropriation but who subsequently
receives such notice.176 In contrast, under the UTSA, even innocent recipients of
trade secrets are subject to liability for use or disclosure after they know or should
have known that the information was a trade secret that was originally acquired
wrongfully (or disclosed by mistake or in breach of confidence). 177
The North Carolina Trade Secret Act, on the other hand, defines
misappropriation more broadly than the UTSA. It eliminates the concept of
"improper means" and finds misappropriation whenever a trade secret is acquired,
disclosed, or used "without express or implied authority or consent, unless such
trade secret was arrived at by independent development, reverse engineering, or was
obtained from another person with a right to disclose the trade secret." 178 This
language would condemn an unauthorized use of a trade secret even if the user
neither used improper means of acquisition herself nor knew (nor had reason to
know) that the information was initially acquired improperly. 179 South Carolina's
Trade Secret Act includes a provision, not found in the UTSA or in the legislation
of any other state, specifically addressing trade secret misappropriation in the
employer-employee context.180
174 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102(4) (1997).
175 See S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-20(5)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997).
176 See ALA. CODE § 8-27-3 cmt. (1993) (stating that "proper appropriation without notice
of an earlier misappropriation cannot be misappropriation under the statute even if subsequent
notice is given").
177 See UTSA § 1(2)(ii).
178 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(1) (1997).
179 See Root & Blynn, supra note 146, at 835.
180 See S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997).
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c. Other Differences181
Under the UTSA, actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined, but
only for as long as the secrecy exists plus an additional "lead time" to eliminate the
misappropriator's advantage.182 In exceptional circumstances, the court may order
the payment of royalties in lieu of injunctive relief.183 Many states have extensively
changed these provisions, 184 creating substantial inconsistencies.185 The
compensatory damage provisions of the UTSA, as strengthened by the 1985
amendments, have likewise been radically altered by a number of states.186
On the issue of exemplary damages, the UTSA authorizes an award of
exemplary damages not exceeding twice the compensatory amount in cases of
"willful and malicious misappropriation."1 87 Deviations from the UTSA model
range from some states setting no limit on the award188 to other states eliminating
the provision altogether.189 With respect to attorneys' fees, the UTSA allows the
181 This subsection, which deals mostly with issues of remedy, is included in the interest of
covering all major statutory variations among states that have adopted the UTSA. The case for a
uniform federal trade secrets law focuses primarily on the effect of a non-uniform law on primary
conduct, and I recognize that procedural rules probably do not have as much impact on primary
conduct as substantive law.
182 See UTSA § 2(a).
183 See UTSA § 2(b). The words "in exceptional circumstances" were added to the section
in the 1985 amendments because critics claimed that without the limiting language, courts had too
much discretion to order what is essentially a compulsory license instead of issuing an injunction.
184 See Samuels & Johnson, supra note 144, at 70-75 (describing in detail the states' specific
deviations on injunctive relief). For example, Alabama eliminates §§ 2(b) and 2(c) of the UTSA
completely. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-4(1) (1993). Colorado, which does not address compelled
royalty payments at all, does not provide standards for continuing an injunction. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-74-103 (1997). North Carolina changes the language of the section completely and
apparently applies a more liberal standard in granting injunctive relief. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-
154 (1997). Illinois increases the discretion of the court in decisions to terminate an injunction. See
765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN., 1065/2 (West 1993).
185 See D. Kirk Jamieson, Just Deserts: A Model to Harmonize Trade Secret Injunctions, 72
NEB. L. REv. 515, 547-67 (1993) (suggesting a new model to harmonize trade secret injunctive
relief).
186 See Samuels & Johnson, supra note 144, at 75-83.
187 UTSA § 3(b).
188 See, e.g., MONT. CODEANN. § 30-14-404 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154 (1997). In
North Carolina, the authority to order exemplary damages lies with the jury, not the judge as in the
UTSA. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154 (1997).
189 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-606 (Michie 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1433
(West 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-504 (1994). In Alabama and Colorado, exemplary damages
may not exceed the amount of the compensatory award. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-4 (1993); CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 7-74-104 (1997). However, Alabama also sets a floor of $5,000 for exemplary
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award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in egregious cases.190 At
least a few states have excluded this UTSA section from their state versions.191
Finally, on the statute of limitations, the UTSA sets a 3-year period that begins
to run when the misappropriation "is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been discovered." 192 Several states have altered this
provision, with some states adopting a longer period and one state a shorter
period. 193
Beyond the express statutory variations, jurisdictions sometimes interpret
differently even identical elements in the states' statutes. For example,
disagreements exist as to the meaning of improper means, 194 the appropriate
standards for evaluating requests for injunctive relief,195 and the level of security
precautions required of the trade secret owner to satisfy the secrecy requirement 1 96
In short, the differences between the Restatement and the UTSA, the various state
modifications to the UTSA, and the interpretational differences of even identical
state provisions are responsible for the lack of uniformity in trade secrets law.
B. The Importance of Trade Secrets to Interstate Commerce
The importance of trade secrets law to interstate business has long been
recognized and is undisputed. In fact, the UTSA was drafted in 1979 largely in
response to concerns about having a non-uniform law govern an area so significant
to interstate commerce. 197 Unfortunately, the UTSA fell short of its goal of unifying
the law,198 even while trade secrecy began assuming a more integral role in the
damages if they are awarded. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-4 (1993).
190 See UTSA § 4.
191 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910 to 45.50.940; IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to 48-807;
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to 87-507.
192 UTSA § 6.
193 The Maine and Nebraska acts provide a four-year statute of limitations, and Illinois has
a five-year period. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1547 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-
506 (1994); 765 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 1065/7 (West 1993). The Alabama act provides a shorter
statute of limitations of 2 years. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-5 (1993).
194 See MICHAEL A. EPSrEIN, MODERN NELLEcruAL PROPERTY § 2.04[A] (3d ed. 1995).
195 See 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 7.02 (noting the different approaches to injunctions).
196 See Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth
Amendment Analogy, 106 HARv. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (1992) (discussing the requirement of
reasonable security precautions).
197 See UTSA prefatory note, 14 U.LA.. at 434 ("Notwithstanding the commercial
importance of trade secret law to interstate business, this law has not developed satisfactorily.").
198 The UTSA has been unable to replicate the degree of uniformity that the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) has achieved because, unlike the UCC, the UTSA has not been adopted
by all the states, and even the adopting states often substantially modified the Act prior to
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intellectual property system and trade secret misappropriation became more of a
national problem with interstate and sometimes international ramifications. 199
Trade secret issues increasingly implicate many states, partly because
proprietary information is often ephemeral with no set location. They can "exist"
wherever the information is used or wherever a person who knows about it is
located.200 For companies with multistate operations, their trade secrets may exist
in every state in which they do business and may be vulnerable to misappropriation
in each such state. In fact, with the emergence of new electronic media, such as e-
mail and the internet, proprietary information is susceptible to misappropriation not
merely in the companies' states of operation, but in every other state and sometimes
in other countries.20 1 Even a cursory look at relevant case law confirms that trade
secret cases generally have multistate connections and impact.202
Congress apparently recognized this fact when it passed the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA),20 3 a federal law criminalizing trade secret thefts.204
enactment.
199 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 5-6 (1996).
200 See Pace, supra note 8, at 446.
201 See House Comm. Hearing on EF, supra note 87 (statement of Thomas W. Brunner,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (commenting that misappropriation of trade secrets today is less
likely to occur in the "traditional manner," but will increasingly be undertaken from "remote
locations, even internationally"); see also Andrews, supra note 86 and accompanying text
(describing the GM/Lopez-Volkswagen misappropriation case); Jager & Cook, supra note 86 and
accompanying text (discussing same); Stem & Mitchner, supra note 86 and accompanying text
(discussing same).
202 See infra notes 218,223,225,227.
203 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997). The EEA has two primary thrusts.
First, it penalizes trade secret theft by or for the benefit of a foreign government or entity with fines
up to $10 million and imprisonment ofup to 15 years. See id. § 1831. Second, it penalizes ordinary
trade secret thefts involving domestic concerns with fines up to $5 million and imprisonment of
upto 10 years. See id. § 1832.
204 The EEA defines the term "trade secret" to mean:
(3)... all forms and types of financial business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including pattems, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas,
designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether
tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if-
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
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The bill was passed after Louis Freeh, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and industry leaders testified before the House and Senate on the
magnitude of the national problem created by trade secret misappropriation and on
its economic cost to the nation.205 The legislative history of the EEA includes
specific findings of a close nexus between trade secrets and interstate and foreign
commerce.
2 06
In recommending passage of the EEA, a Senate committee noted that
development of trade secrets "involves every aspect of interstate commerce and
business" and is critical to the health of interstate commerce. The committee also
noted that trade secrets either move in or substantially affect interstate commerce,
and the theft of trade secrets substantially harms interstate commerce.20 7 The
The theft of a trade secret is committed if someone "knowingly-
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by
fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads,
uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communuicates, or conveys a trade secret;
(3) receives, buys, or possess a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or
appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of the paragraphs (1) through (3);
or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any
of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do act to affect the object of
the conspiracy.
Id. §§ 1831(a)(1)-(a)(5), 1832(aX)-(aX5).
205 See Senate Comm. Hearing on EEA, supra note 33 (statements of FBI Director Freeh;
Raymond Damadian, Fonmar Corp.); House Comm. Hearing on EEA, supra note 87 (statements
of FBI Director Freeh; Thomas W. Brnner, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; John P. Melton, SDL,
Inc.; Peter F. McCloskey, Electronic Industries Assoc.; David M. Shannon, Intel Corp.; Dan
Whitema, General Motors Corp.).
Although the hearings seemed to focus on foreign rather than domestic economic espionage,
Congress stressed that the economic cost of domestic trade secret misappropriation was also high.
See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 8-9 (1996) (describing reports of domestic trade secret thefts). In fact,
the EEA covers trade secret thefts not only by foreign governments and companies, but also by
domestic concerns as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
206 See S. REp. No. 104-359, at 1-2 (1996).
2 07 See id. The Report stated:
Section 2 Findings and Purposes.
(a) Findings. Congress finds that
(1) sustaining a healthy and competitive national economy is imperative;
(2) the development and production of proprietary economic information involves
every aspect of interstate commerce and business;
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committee then concluded that a comprehensive federal criminal law on trade secret
misappropriation was essential because of the national scope of the problem and the
inadequacy of the state laws.208 These committee findings of strong linkage
between trade secrets and interstate and foreign commerce, which supported
enactment of the EEA, should likewise justify federal civil trade secrets
legislation.209
Although Congress stressed only the economic toll that trade secrets loss takes
on interstate commerce, there is a nexus between trade secrets law and interstate and
foreign commerce in other ways as well. An overly broad trade secrets law, for
example, may result in too much information being removed from the public
domain and a lessening of competition, which obviously impacts interstate
commerce. In other words, not only under-protection, but over-protection of trade
secrets, can have substantial adverse consequences for interstate commerce.
C. Complexity of Choice ofLaw Problems
The frequent multistate relationships in trade secret cases, and the lack of a
(3) the development, production, protection, and lawful exchange, sale, and transfer of
proprietary economic information is essential to maintaining the health and competitiveness
of interstate commerce and the national economy;
(4) much proprietary economic information moves in interstate and foreign commerce
and proprietary economic information that does not move in interstate or foreign commerce
directly and substantially affects proprietary economic information that does;
(5) the theft, wrongful destruction or alteration, misappropriation, and wrongful
conversion of proprietary economic information substantially affects and harms interstate
commerce ....
(6) enforcement of existing state laws protecting proprietary economic information is
frustrated by the ease with which stolen or wrongfully appropriated proprietary economic
information is transferred across State and national boundaries.
Id.
2 08 Seeid. at 11.
209 There are limits to the usefulness of the EEA. As a criminal statute, the EEA requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which may be difficult to establish in some cases. Furthermore,
although the EEA theoretically covers all intentional thefts of trade secrets, Congress clearly
intended it to be enforced sparingly. Each case must receive the prior approval and subsequent
close supervision of either the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division. See JAGER, supra note 6, app. P, at 46-47 (explaining
that the original version of the EEA expressly provided that all prosecutions under the statute
receive the prior approval of one of these top three criminal enforcers; the provision was omitted
in the final bill only after Attorney General Janet Reno assured Congress in writing that the
safeguards would be implemented as internal policy and that the policy requirements would be
inserted into the U.S. Attorney's Manual). Hence, as a practical matter, the EEA is likely to be used
only against trade secret thefts of national significance.
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uniform law, lead to a related problem involving choice of law issues. Choice of law
is necessary whenever a legal dispute implicates the differing substantive laws of
more than one state.210 In an information-based economy, trade secrets may be
located, improperly taken, misused, or wrongfiflly disclosed in a multitude of states,
thereby posing conflict of law problems in an increasing number of cases.
It is, of course, well established that there is no general federal common law211
and, therefore, a federal court sitting in diversity must follow the choice of law rules
prevailing in the forum state.212 Two choice of law doctrines generally govem in
tort actions: the traditional lex loci delicti rule and the modem significant
relationship approach.213 Lex loci delicti, articulated in the Restatement (First) of
2 10 Choice of law is not to be confused with personal jurisdiction. A court may have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant because the defendant was physically present within the state or had
sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy considerations of fair play and substantial justice. See
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945). Yet, the court may be obligated
by its own choice of law rules to apply the substantive law of another state to the claim.
Conversely, a defendant may not have had sufficient contacts with the forum state to be subject
to its personal jurisdiction, even though the forum state, under its choice of law rules, may properly
apply its own substantive laws to the controversy. On the difference between personal jurisdiction
and choice of law, see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,254 (1958) ("The issue [in the case] is
personal jurisdiction, not choice of law."). Interestingly, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the
federal constitution more severely restricts a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction than its choice
of law. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End ofan Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 82-83 (1978).
211 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Torrkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
2 12 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,486 (1941). Klaxon, of course,
has been heavily criticized as unnecessary under the Constitution and an unwarranted extension
of the Erie doctrine into choice of law. See, eg., William F. Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22-42 (1963); Harold W. Horowitz, TowardA Federal Common Law
of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (1967); Harold L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law
Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772, 971 (1983); Russell J. Weintraub, The Erie
Doctrine andState Conflict of LawRules, 39 IND. L.L 228,246-48 (1964).
213 For an overview of the different choice of law approaches, see Jeffrey M. Shaman, The
Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF.
L. REV. 329 (1997); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1995: A
Year in Review, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 181 (1996).
In addition to lex loci deliciti and the significant relationship test, there is a third approach-
the govemrnment interest analysis-which a few states apply. The government interest analysis calls
for examining the underlying policies of the substantive laws of each implicated state and
assessing if each state has a real interest in having its law chosen. If the analysis shows that only
one state, in fact, has an interest which would be compromised were its laws not applied, there is
a 'false conflict," and the law of the state truly interested in the dispute would be applied. If there
is a true conflict, i.e., more than one state has a real interest, then the government interest doctrine
calls for applying the law of the forum. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICr OF LAWs: FoUNDAnoNs
AND FUIURE DIRECIONS 58-62 (1991); BRAERD CURRI, SELECrED EssAYs ON THE CONFLiCr
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Conflict of Laws, requires applying the law of the place where the wrong
occurred.2 14 It was the dominant approach before the 1960s, and it continues to be
followed in ten to twelve jurisdictions,215 despite harsh criticism of the rule for its
formalism and inflexibility.216 In trade secret cases, the approach means applying
the law of the state where the defendant committed the alleged wrong, or benefited
from it.2 17 Characterizing and ascertaining where a wrong was committed can be
difficult in trade secret cases because events are often not discrete phenomena
occurring neatly in one jurisdiction. Furthermore, the jurisdiction where the alleged
wrong took place may be different from the jurisdiction where a defendant derived
a benefit, such as where a defendant takes a trade secret in one state but profits from
it in others. 218
Enjoying wider judicial acceptance than lex loci delicti is the newer "significant
relationship" rule proposed in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict ofLaws.2 19 This
OF LAws 183-84 (1963); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277
(1990).
Variations of the government interest rule include applying the law of the state whose
interests would be most impaired if its law were not chosen, or applying the "better law," instead
ofthe law ofthe forum. See Baxter, supra note 212, at 42 (proposing the comparative impairment
variation); Robert Leflar, Conflicts Law: More Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966) (suggesting the "better law" variation).
214 See RESTArEMnT (IRST) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 377-379 (1934).
215 Professor Symeonides' study shows that twelve states follow the traditional lex loci
delicti rule in tort cases (ten states adopt it in contract cases). They are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas,
Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. See Symeonides, supra note 213, at 197-98.
216 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 213 (going beyond mere criticism to propose a new
construct-the "govemment interes' analysis); David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173 (1933); Elliott E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of
Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1945); Walter W. Cook, The Logical and
Legal Bases of the Conflict ofLaw, 33 YALE L.. 457 (1924); Hessell E. Yntema, The Hornbook
Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.. 468 (1928).
217 See, e.g., Wilson v. Electro Marine Sys., Inc., 915 F.2d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1990);
Goldberg v. Medtronic, Inc., 686 F.2d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F2d
369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953); see also 1 JAGER, supra note 6, § 4.02[3].
218 See, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1953) (involving a
confidential relationship arising in New Jersey, defendant's improper use of the trade secret in
Massachusetts, and the sale of the product incorporating the misappropriated trade secret in New
York and other states); Connecticut Artcraft Corp. v. Smith, 574 F. Supp. 626, 628-30 (D. Conn.
1983) (involving disclosure of the trade secret in a series of telephone calls between Connecticut
and Florida, and the misuse of the secret in Florida); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 206, 212 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (involving the planning of the misappropriation in
New York, the physical transmittal of the trade secret in Ohio, and defendant's misuse of the secret
in New York).
219 See § 145(1971).
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approach, adopted in twenty jurisdictions for tort conflicts,220 calls for choosing the
substantive law of the state with the most significant relationship to the transaction
and to the parties. To determine which state that might be, four factors are
considered: (1) the place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the
relationship between the parties is centered.221
These factors obviously do not set forth bright-line rules. Assuming that the
injury and the conduct causing the injury occurred in a single state, the inquiry
would probably not be difficult since that state would likely be the one with the
most significant relationship. 222 But where, as is more likely, a defendant acted in
one or more states and the resulting injury occurred in yet other states, choice of law
becomes more difficult.2 23 Engaging in choice of law analysis is obviously more
than an academic exercise since it may well change the outcome of a case.224
Of course, the fact that trade secret cases pose conflicts issues does not in itself
warrant federalizing trade secrets law, for such issues are inevitably present in any
action with multistate contacts. But some characteristics of trade secret
misappropriation, which set it apart from most torts, exacerbate the typical
2 20 See Symeonides, supra note 213, at 198-99.
221 See RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971).
222 See id. § 145 cmt. e (suggesting that domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation, and place of business of the parties do not carry much weight by themselves; their
importance "depends largely on the extent to which they are grouped with other contacts').
223 See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424,426-31 (3d Cir. 1982)
(involving Pennsylvania, where plaintiff had its principal place of business and where the secret
was entrusted to an employee in confidence-presumably the state ofinjury to plaintiff due to lost
profits-and New Jersey, where the corporate defendant was incorporated, had its principal place
of business, and exploited the trade secret-presumably the state of defendant's wrongful
conduct); CPG Prods., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 211 (involving Minnesota (where plaintiff was
incorporated and headquartered), Ohio (where plaintiffhad a place of business, developed the trade
secret, and where the actual physical transmission of the trade secret took place), and New York
(where defendant was incorporated, planned the misappropriation scheme, and subsequently
wrongfully used the trade secret)).
224 See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 566 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), affd, 982 F.2d 693, 718 (2d Cir. 1992), on remand, 832 F. Supp. 50, 51-52 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (choosing Texas law resulted in the barring of plaintiff's trade secret claim, which would
have been viable had New York substantive law controlled). Texas, which has not adopted the
UTSA, applies a two-year statute of limitations to trade secret misappropriation claims. Unlike
other jurisdictions, its statutory period begins to run when the wrongful act is committed,
regardless of when the wrong was discovered or should have been discovered. Plaintiff's claim
in ComputerAssociates v. Altai was filed more than two years after the cause of action accrued,
but within two years of the date that the parties stipulated it should have known of the
misappropriation. See id. at 51-54.
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complexities in determining which state's substantive law should apply.
In trade secret cases, ascertaining precisely where the injury or the alleged act
of misappropriation took place is often a problem. For example, where the plaintiff
was headquartered in Minnesota and had an office in Ohio (where the trade secret
was developed and located), and where the defendant improperly used plaintiff's
trade secret in New York, it is not clear whether plaintiff was injured in Minnesota,
Ohio, or New York, or perhaps all three states.225 Similarly, where a defendant
planned the misappropriation and later improperly exploited the misappropriated
trade secret in New York, but the actual physical transmission of the information
took place in Ohio,226 determining whether the defendant's bad conduct occurred
in New York or Ohio may be difficult 227 Furthermore, e-mail and the intemet have
made it possible for misappropriators to gain access to their competitors' trade
secrets by invading the competitors' computer systems from remote locations.228
This, in turn, compounds the difficulty in pinpointing the critical events so as to
arrive at the appropriate choice of law.229
22 5 See CPG Prods., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 206. One could argue that plaintiff suffered the
effects of its profit losses in Minnesota, where it had its principal place of business. Alternatively,
it could be said that plaintiff's losses were directly felt in Ohio, where the trade secret was
developed and located and where plaintiffhad an office. Or, plaintiff could have been injured in
New York, in the form of potential lost sales resulting from defendant's wrongful exploitation of
the trade secret in that state. More likely, plaintiff was injured in all three states.
226 See id
227 For additional cases with complicated multistate involvement, see, for example, Sil-Flo,
Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving a plaintiffincorporated in Delaware
with an office in Oklahoma, a plant in Texas, and a mine in Arizona; a defendant incorporated in
Oklahoma where it carried out much of its allegedly wrongful activities; an individual plaintiff
domiciled in New York, and individual defendants domiciled in Oklahoma); Default Proof Credit
Card Sys., Inc. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 753 F. Supp. 1566, 1567, 1570 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(involving a Florida corporate plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporate defendant, misappropriation
which took place primarily in Massachusetts and Georgia, and injury that was felt in Florida and
other states); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250,254 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
(involving a plaintiff incorporated in Indiana, a defendant incorporated in New York with offices
in New York and Connecticut and a plant in California, and the defendant's improper use of the
trade secret in California), aff'd, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960).
228 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 ViLL. L. REV. 1, 49 (1996)
(arguing that because the electronic media allows "actor, intermediaries and victim" to be in
geographically distinct and distant locations, choice of law analysis requires "careful scrutiny of
the technology").
229 The use of electronic media for the misappropriation of trade secrets has become
commonplace and is frequently reported in the news. See Jager & Cook, supra note 86. However,
there are only a handful of reported judicial decisions involving misappropriation using such
means. They include a series of cases brought by the Church of Scientology in its decade-old battle
with Church dissidents alleging misappropriation of the Church's trade secrets, in this case sacred
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Even assuming that choosing the controlling substantive law is not unduly
difficult once misappropriation occurs, uncertainty about which state's law will
govern frustrates rational planning by those who own the trade secrets. A
fundamental concept of trade secrets law is that an owner must take reasonable
measures to preserve the secrecy of the information for which legal protection is
sought.230 If trade secrets may be misappropriated anywhere, to avail themselves
of protection, businesses must "either adopt a different confidentiality program" for
each state in which they operate or "adopt one confidentiality program designed to
satisfy the most restrictive aspects of the trade secret laws" of all of the states in
which future misappropriation is likely.231 The first choice would obviously be
inefficient, as would be the second choice (except in the unlikely event that the
proposed federal trade secrets law is more demanding of trade secret owners than
the most restrictive state trade secrets law currently in effect).2 32 Enacting a uniform
trade secrets law would solve difficult choice of law problems2 33 and also possibly
documents. In these cases, the Church's confidential documents, which were prepared in
California, its headquarters, were taken by unknown individual(s) through improper means and
circulated among Church dissidents. In one case, a dissident in Virginia posted the documents on
the internet via his Virginia internet access provider, and the documents were accessible to and
were read by people in many states. In a similar case, another dissident and his Colorado-based,
nonprofit, bulletin board service also posted the document on the intemet. In each of these cases,
the court applied the substantive law of the forum, without engaging in any choice of law analysis.
See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260 (ED. Va. 1995) (Lerma I); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (ED. Va. 1995) (Lerma 1); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908
F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Va. 1995) (Lerma P; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F.
Supp. 1519 (D. Colo. 1995).
230 See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
231 See Pace, supra note 8, at 446-47,448 n.69 (assuming that choice of law is not unduly
difficult but arguing for a federal trade secrets law for efficiency reasons, to ensure that businesses
will not have to implement a confidentiality plan that meets the requirements of the most
demanding jurisdiction).
232 If a federal law were as demanding of trade secret owners (in terms of efforts at
maintaining secrecy) as the most restrictive state law, then no difference in efficiency would
follow.
233 As a solution to choice of law problems arising in complex litigation, many conflicts
scholars have advocated federalizing the choice of law rules for mass-torts and other litigation that
frequently implicate multiple states. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 212, at 40-41; Michael H.
Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Casefor Federal Choice ofLaw Statutes, 80 GEO.
LJ. 1 (1991); Horowitz, supra note 212, at 1191; Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice ofLaw
for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1623 (1992). But see Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in
Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996) (rejecting the notion that complex litigation
justifies manipulating choice of law rules).
Although federalizing choice of law rules will bring some order to choice of law analysis, it
will not, in my view, solve the central problems associated with the lack of substantive uniformity
in an area of the law that is so important to interstate commerce.
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save trade secret owners from having to implement inefficient secrecy strategies.
D. U.S. Obligations Under NAFTA and TRIPS
Aside from the domestic concerns discussed above, the United States'
international trade policy makes a compelling case for federal trade secrets
legislation.2 34 The United States currently enjoys a competitive edge, and a
significant trade surplus, in exports of high-technology related goods and
services.2 35 Not surprisingly, then, international protection for the intellectual
property interests of American businesses is a centerpiece in the government's
international trade policy.236
The United States has long protested the inadequate intellectual property laws
of other countries, 237 contending that their failure to protect American intellectual
property interests abroad effectively operates as a non-tariff barrier.238 To remedy
the situation and to open international markets to American exports, the government
has insisted on strong protective measures for United States intellectual property
rights in multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade negotiations.2 39 Primarily due to
234 See Pace, supra note 8, at 450-56.
235 See supra notes 63, 66 and accompanying text.
236 See Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection In an
Age ofAdvancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. IN'L L. & POL'Y 465,465 (1994) (observing that the
international protection of intellectual property rights "occupies an important position on the U.S.
agenda for proposed reforms of the international trading system"). See generally Spencer Weber
Waller & Noel J. Byme, Changing View of Intellectual Property and Competition Law in the
European Community and the United States of America, 20 BROoK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993)
(discussing American efforts to promote international respect for intellectual property rights); Brent
W. Sadler, Note, Intellectual Property Protection Through International Trade, 14 Hous. . INT'L
L. 393, 393-96 (1992).
237 See, e.g., US. Trade Policy and NAFTA: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
103d Cong. 8-45, 48-55 (1993) (statement of Ambassador Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade
Representative) (stating that one of his main objectives as Trade Representative was to open
foreign markets to American businesses by pursuing strong protection for their intellectual
property rights).
238 See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward
a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 298 (1991) (noting that the cost of innovation is
higher than the cost of imitation, and, thus, a foreign country's failure to protect American
intellectual property interests abroad is as effective as a tariff because it raises the price of the
imported American good relative to the local good); U.S. Framework Proposal to GA T
Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1371 (1987) (proposing
stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights as a means ofreducing barriers to trade).
239 See US. Trade Policy andNAF'TA, supra note 237 (stating that opening foreign markets
to the U.S., which entails pursuing strong protective measures for U.S. intellectual property, was
the main American objective in the Uruguay Round of GATI, NAFrA, and bilateral trade
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these efforts, the protection of intellectual property rights, including trade secrets,
was ultimately included in two major trade agreements to which the United States
is a party: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFA);240 and the
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS),24 1 arising out of the Uruguay Round of trade talks under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Both international agreements were approved by
Congress through federal implementation statutes. 242
NAFrA243 and TRIPS244 establish minimum substantive standards for
negotiations with Japan, China, and other nations).
240 See supra note 19.
241 See supra note 20.
242 See The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994)); The NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3311 (1994)).
Although trade agreements may be negotiated by the President as treaties, which require the
consent of two-thirds of the Senate, they are often signed as congressional-executive agreements,
which require approval by the majority of both houses of Congress. See HENKIN, supra note 26,
at 175-211,215-18. Congressional-executive agreements are generally considered to have the
same legal effect as treaties. However, they are never self-executing although many treaties are
self-executing. Because they are non-self-executing, congressional-executive agreements do not
become domestic law until Congress passes implementing legislation giving them legal effect.
Strictly speaking, it is the implementing legislation, not the congressional-executive agreement,
that is the law. See id at 198-204, 215-18. But regardless of the status of a congressional-
executive agreement as domestic law, the agreement is binding on the United States vis-a-vis other
signatory nations, which may seek sanctions against the United States under the terms of the
international agreement for breach. See id at 203.
Despite the routine use of congressional-executive agreements as an alternative to treaties for
trade, there is debate about its use. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is Nafta
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (arguing that use of the congressional-executive
agreement for NAFTA is consistent with constitutional text and that the Treaty Clause of Article
V is purely optional); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (disputing
the conclusions of Professors Ackerman and Golove and arguing that a serious textual and
structural interpretation of the Constitution requires that trade agreements be ratified by two-thirds
of the Senate under the Treaty Clause); see also infra notes 283-92 and accompanying text.
243 The United States, Mexico, and Canada signed NAFTA on December 17, 1992. The
trade secret provisions of NAFTA provide, in relevant part, the following:
1. Each Party shall provide the legal means for any person to prevent trade secrets from
being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without the consent of the person lawfully
in control of the information in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices, in so far
as:
(a) the infomation is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible
to persons that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
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intellectual property protection (as well as enforcement procedures) below which
no signatory country may fall.2 45 The agreements mandate that state and provincial
(b) the information has actual or potential commercial value because it is secret
and
(c) the person lawfully in control of the information has taken reasonable steps under
the circumstances to keep it secret
2. A Party may require that to qualify for protection a trade secret must be evidenced
in documents, electronic or magnetic means, optical discs, microfilms, films or similar
instruments.
3. No Party may limit the duration of protection of trade secrets, so long as the
conditions in paragraph I exist.
NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1711, at 675.
244 The United States and 116 other member countries signed TRIPS and other agreements
reached in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on April 15,1994. See Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENT,-RESULTS OF TB URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 LL.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Act] (listing all the signatory countries).
The trade secret provisions of TRIPS provide, in relevant part, the following:
1.Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 ....
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without
their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such
information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within
the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by persons lawfully
in control of the information, to keep it secret
TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 39, at 98.
245 Much has been written about the intellectual property provisions of both NAFTA and
TRIPS. For NAFTA, see Kent S. Foster & Dean C. Alexander, Opportunitiesfor Mexico, Canada
and the United States: A Summary ofIntellectual Property Rights Under the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 67 (1994); Frank J. Garcia, Protection
ofIntellectual Property Rights in the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case
ofRegional Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 817 (1993); George Y. Gonzalez,
Note, An Analysis of the Legal Implications of the Intellectual Property Provisions of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305 (1993).
For TRIPS, see Al J. Daniel, Jr., Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: The Dunkel
Draft and a Comparison of United States Intellectual Property Rights, Remedies, and Border
Measures, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 751 (1993); Doane, supra note 236; J.H. Reichman, The
TRIPS Component of the GATTs Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual
Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAMNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. LJ.
171 (1993); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
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governments of the member countries comply with their terms, and they direct the
member nations to enforce their international obligations by securing conformity
from their respective states and local provinces. 246 If any member nation fails to
meet its commitment, the agreements authorize trade retaliation by the aggrieved
trading partners.2 47
The trade secret provisions of NAFTA and TRIPS are generally consistent with
the UTSA on which they were modeled, 248 and therefore states that have adopted
the UTSA without restrictive modifications are generally in compliance with the
international accords. However, because the Restatement provisions on trade secrets
are less protective in some respects than the UTSA,249 states that continue to abide
by Restatement rules may fall short of the minimum standards established in
NAFTA and TRIPS. For example, the more limiting Restatement definition of
"trade secret' requires that information be continuously used in one's business to
qualify for trade secret status. NAFTA and TRIPS, consistent with the UTSA,
include no such requirement.250 Consequently, in a Restatement jurisdiction,
negative information or information that a trade secret owner has not yet used may
Under the TRIPS Component of the WTOAgreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995).
24 6 See Final Act, supra note 244, art. XXIV, para. 12, at 36; NAFTA, supra note 19, art.
105, at 298. To the extent that NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATr require the United States
to secure conformity from the states by directing the states to enact certain laws, they would seem
to run afoul of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177-80 (1992) (holding that the
Constitution does not permit Congress to compel a state to regulate in a particular way).
24 7 See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 2019, at 697-98; GATr/Uruguay Round:
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15,1993, art.
22, para. 6,33 I.L.M. 112, 126-28.
24 8 NAFTA has one additional condition for trade secret protection that is not found in either
TRIPS or the UTSA: the subject must be in tangible form. See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1711,
see. 2, at 675 ("A Party may require that to qualify for protection a trade secret must be evidenced
in documents, electronic or magnetic means, optical discs, microfilms, films or other similar
instruments!"). This restriction was inserted to accommodate Mexico, whose domestic trade secret
law includes a similar limitation. See LEY DE FOMENTO Y PROTECCION DE LA PROPIEDAD
INDUSTRIAL [LAW FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTEMION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY], translated
in 5 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 241-59, art. 83 (1991) (providing that trade secrets "will
be in documents, electronic or magnetic media, optical disks, microfilms or any other similar
instruments').
2 49 See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
250 Both NAFTA and TRIPS define "trade secret," almost identically, as information that (1)
is not "generally known among or readily accessible" to those who normally deal with the kind
of information in question; (2) has "commercial value" because itis secret; and (3) the person in
control of the information has taken "reasonable steps under the circumstances" to keep the




not receive the protection that is called for under NAFTA or TRIPS.2 51
Furthermore, to the extent that some state versions of the UTSA are more
restrictive than the UTSA, 252 they too may not meet the minimum standards
mandated by the international agreements. For example, Alabama's Trade Secrets
Act demands a showing of the owner's "intention to use the secret in trade or
business" as a prerequisite for protection, a requirement that is not found in NAFrA
or TRIPS.2 53 As another example, Iowa limits third party liability to instances
where the third party has actual knowledge of the original improper acquisition,2 54
whereas NAFTA and TRIPS allow recovery against third parties without actual
knowledge if they were "grossly negligent in failing to know."255
Although state variances that fall below NAFTA and TRIPS standards may not
be numerous, the United States is nonetheless obligated to bring the non-
conforming state laws into compliance. Enacting a federal trade secrets law would
be one way of accomplishing that goal.25 6 It would be ironic indeed if the United
States were to be found in violation25 7 of the very provisions that it had prodded
251 Also, unlike the Restatement, the improper acquisition of another's trade secret is
independently wrongful, even absent subsequent use or disclosure of the trade secret, under both
agreements. See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1711(1), at 675 (protecting trade secrets frombeing
"disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without the consent of the person lawfully in control
of the information in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices"); TRIPS, supra note 20,
art. 39(2), at 98 (same); supra Part IIIA3 and accompanying text on other major differences
between the trade secret provisions in the Restatement and in the UTSA.
252 The most obvious example is Alabama. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (1993 &
Supp. 1997).
2 53 See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. The Alabama Trade Secrets Act further
requires that the information be "embodied" in a tangible form, a restriction not found in TRIPS.
See ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(1) (1993).
254 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(3) (West 1997).
255 NAFFA, supra note 19, art. 1721(2), at 680; TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 39 n.10, at 98.
This language differs somewhat from the UTSA which finds third party liability if the third party
"knew or had reason to know" that improper means were used to acquire the secret. It is unclear
whether the international agreements' "grossly negligent in failing to know" standard is easier to
meet than UTSA's "had reason to know" standard. One commentator suggests that it is, see Pace,
supra note 8, at 453, although I tend to disagree.
256 The federal government could, of course, simply "consult with the States for the purpose
of achieving conformity of State laws and practices" with the trade agreements. See The NAFTA
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 102(bXIXA), 107 Stat. 2057,2062 (1993); Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102 (b)(1)(A), 108 Stat. 4809,4815 (1994).
257 Both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT include elaborate dispute resolution
mechanisms. Under the Uruguay Round, for example, all signatory nations agree to submit to the
authority of the World Trade Organization (WTO), established by the Uruguay Round, and its
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) or Appellate Body, and any signatory country aggrieved by an
allegedly offending law of another signatory country may request the DSB to establish a panel to
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foreign governments to accept.
Apart from the binding requirements of NAFTA and TRIPS, the enactment of
a federal trade secrets law would also give the United States more credibility in its
campaign to seek stronger international protective measures for trade secrets outside
of NAFTA and TPS.258 Trade secrets are currently the only form of intellectual
property not subject to federal protection in this country. Other nations may
misconstrue this fact as an indication that the United States itself does not truly view
trade secrecy as a national priority and may more strenuously resist American
demands for stronger trade secrets law.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AND THE POLICY OF FEDERALISM
The subject of federalism has two dimensions: constitutional federalism, which
is whether and to what extent the United States Constitution permits a federal trade
secrets law;, and the policy of federalism, which is whether such a law, assuming its
constitutionality, would fiustrate the values of federalism. The following first
examines three possible constitutional bases for federal action: the Patent and
Copyright Clause,259 the foreign affairs power,260 and the Commerce Clause.261
This Article then looks at the policy of federalism.
consider the matter. If the panel (or Appellate Boay) finds the law or regulation in question illegal
under GAIT, the offending nation would be bound by that decision unless the entire GATF
membership agrees to overturn the adverse decision. See GATT/Uruguay Round: Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra note 247, arts. 1-22, at
114-28; NAFrA, supra note 19, arts. 2003-19, at 694-98; Samuel C. Straight, Note, GA7Tand
NAFTA: Manying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifiy States, 45 DUKE
L.J. 216,219-34 (1995) (discussing the dispute resolution mechanisms of NAFTA and GATT).
2 58 See Pace, supra note 8, at 456.
25 9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times, to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). This clause is
popularly referred to as the Patent and Copyright Clause although there is no mention of patents
or copyrights in the language of the clause.
260 It is long settled that any legislation enacted by Congress must be based on an
enumerated power in the Constitution, a principle reinforced by the Tenth Amendment, which
reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the federal government under the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. amend. X; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,155-56 (1992). However,
some powers, such as the foreign affairs power of Congress, are considered inherent in national
sovereignty although unenumerated. See supra note 26.
261 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
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A. Constitutional Basis
1. The Patent and Copyright Clause
At first glance, the express grant of constitutional authority to Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,"262 popularly known as the
Patent and Copyright Clause, seems to provide solid grounding for federal
regulation of trade secrets. The inclusion of the Patent Clause as an enumerated
power suggests that the framers of the Constitution considered intellectual
endeavors a matter affecting the nation as a whole, the promotion of which requires
national attention, not separate state treatment. Pursuant to this clause, the First
Congress enacted the federal patent and copyright laws,263 and it would appear that
the clause should logically sustain federal protection of another type of intellectual
property-trade secrets.
Indeed, when Congress enacted the EEA (the federal trade secrets criminal
statute) in 1996, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated that authority for the
act would come from the Patent and Copyright Clause, and the Commerce
Clause.264 Interestingly, beyond that single statement no further reference to the
Patent and Copyright Clause can be found in the legislative history of the act 2 65
which included, in contrast detailed findings of the interstate implications of trade
secrets.266 The absence of any discussion of the Patent Clause suggests that it was
probably considered a weaker, or at least less certain, constitutional basis for the
EEA than the Commerce Clause. Given the history of the federal trademark laws,
this assessment is understandable.
Congress first sought to regulate trademarks pursuant to the Patent and
Copyright Clause in 1870.267 The act provided a federal registration scheme for all
trademarks to which an applicant had established an exclusive right by usage, and
it protected trademarks so registered against unauthorized use.2 68 This first foray
into federal trademark protection failed, however, when the Supreme Court
invalidated the statute in the Trade-Mark Cases.269 Narrowly construing the Patent
262 US. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
263 See supra note 41.
264 See S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 4 (1996).
265 See id. at 11-12; H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN.
4021,4022.
26 6 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
267 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, construed in Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82,92 (1879).
268 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
2 69 Id. The Trade-Mark Cases consists of three separate cases challenging the
constitutionality of the trademark law which were consolidated on appeal to the Supreme Court.
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Clause to permit federal regulation of only those matters having a "necessary
relation to invention or discovery," 270 the Court held that reliance on the Patent
Clause for constitutional authority was misplaced since "neither originality,
invention, discovery, science, nor art [was] in any way essential 271 for protection
under the challenged act. The current federal trademark statute, commonly known
as the Lanham Act,272 was later enacted in 1946 pursuant to Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce.273
Under the Court's reasoning in the Trade-Mark Cases, it would be difficult to
look to the Patent and Copyright Clause for constitutional support for a federal trade
secrets law. Although trade secrets may involve originality, invention, discovery,
science or the arts, their protection under trade secrets law does not require a
relation to these traits. 274 In fact, any information that has potential benefit to the
owner and is not generally known to competitors, such as a mere customer list or
business plan, is protectable as a trade secret. To the extent that the Patent and
Copyright Clause is construed to authorize only laws with a necessary connection
with inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences exhibiting novelty and
originality, it is unlikely to supply the constitutional basis for a federal trade secrets
law.2 75
2 70 Id. at 94.
271 Id.
272 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1 127 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
2 73 See id § 1051 ('The owner of a trade-mark used in commerce may apply to register his
or her trade-mark under this Chapter... ).
2 74 Seesupra notes 53-54 and Part I.A.1-A.2.
275 But perhaps it is time to revisit the Trade-Mark Cases, which was decided in the pre-New
Deal era when the Supreme Court was prone to taking an extremely restrictive approach to federal
powers, especially in the Commerce Clause context, without due consideration of the teaching of
the landmark case on the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution-McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). Justice Marshall held in McCulloch that "necessary" does not
mean indispensable but merely "convenient' or "useful" and that the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress to select any means intended to exercise its legitimate powers, even if the
means chosen are not absolutely necessary to attain the end. See id. at 413. Had the Trade-Mark
Cases properly considered the teaching of McCulloch, the question asked should have been
whether trademark protection was useful or convenient, not whether it was absolutely necessary,
for the promotion of science and arts. Had the question been phrased that way, the answer should
have been "yes," and reliance on the Patent Clause for the trademark law would have been
justified. Similarly, a correct reading of McCulloch should mean as long as trade secrecy is a useful
or convenient way to promote the sciences and the arts, as it obviously is, federal legislation would
be permissible under the clause regardless of whether invention and discovery are essential to the
rights conferred by such a law.
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2. The Foreign Affairs Power
Had NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT, of which TRIPS is a
component, been signed by the President as treaties,276 with the requisite
concurrence of the Senate, a'federal trade secrets law could easily rest on national
authority over foreign affairs.2 77 The Constitution explicitly gives the President the
power, with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, to make treaties with foreign
nations. 278 Under the Supremacy Clause, these treaties become the "supreme Law
of the Land," superseding contrary state laws.279 In Missouri v. Holland,280 Justice
Holmes rejected the argument that the Tenth Amendment barred treaties from
dealing with matters reserved to the states, and held that Congress, in implementing
a treaty, may regulate even local affairs not otherwise reachable under other grants
of power.281
276 The Constitution itself does not define treaties or distinguish them from other types of
international agreements. See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 175, 184. A treaty is commonly
considered "an agreement between two or more states or international organizations that is
intended to be legally binding and is governed by international law." RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF
THE FoREIGN RELAnONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 301 (1987). There are two types of
treaties: those that do not require an act of Congress to enforce (self-executing) and those that do
require congressional action (non-self-executing). See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 198-204.
277 Indeed, if a treaty were self-executing, i.e., did not require an act of Congress to give it
legal effect as domestic law, it would automatically become, under the Supremacy Clause, part of
the "supreme Law of the Land" rendering contrary state laws invalid. See U.S. CONsr. art. VI, § 2.
278 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur"). The Constitution also expressly prohibits states from treaty making. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
2 79 SeeU.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. This clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority ofthe United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,432 (1920) (stating that "treaties made under
the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the United States
made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land").
280 253 U.S. 416 (1920).
281 See id. at 432-34. Although treaties are not limited by the Tenth Amendment, they are
subject to other constitutional constraints, particularly the Bill of Rights. See Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957) (rejecting the argument that an international agreement is free from all
constitutional restraints and explaining that Missouri v. Holland only held that the Tenth
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NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GAIT, however, were not signed as
treaties but as congressional-executive agreements,282 raising the question of
whether a federal trade secrets act can still be rooted in the foreign affairs power of
Congress. Congressional-executive agreements with foreign countries are made by
the President with the pre- or post-approval of the majority of both houses of
Congress.2 83 The constitutional foundation of these agreements is unclear. The
Constitution does not expressly empower the President to make non-treaty
agreements. Nor does it explicitly confer power on Congress to regulate foreign
affairs independent of its authority to implement valid treaties.
284
Those who question the constitutionality of congressional-executive
agreements argue that Congress, which has no authority to negotiate with foreign
governments, cannot delegate what it does not have to the President.28 5 But others
respond that the combined authorities of Congress (to legislate) and the President
(to negotiate with foreign nations) are sufficient to vest joint authority in Congress
and the President to make these agreements.286 Regardless of the merits of these
Amendment was not a barrier to the treaty power).
282 See NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 101(a), 107 Stat. 2057,2061
(1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (1994)) (citing congressional approval of NAFTA); Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 1016, 108 Stat. 4809,4814 (1994) (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994)) (same).
283 See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 215-16. Some agreements, termed "sole-executive
agreements," can be made by the President on his own authority. See id. at 219-24.
284 Some have tried to derive Congress's foreign affairs power, by implication, from other
explicit grants of power. For example, it has been suggested that the power of Congress to regulate
commerce with foreign nations gives rise to a plenary federal power in foreign affairs, or that
Congress's power to do what is "necessary and proper" to carry out other powers under the
Constitution encompasses conducting foreign affairs. See id. 14-15. Despite confusion about the
source, the Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress is empowered to regulate foreign
affairs, independent of its authority to implement treaties. See infra note 287.
285 See J. B. MOORE, 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY,
MiNTrES XV-XVI (1921), quoted in HENKIN, supra note 26, at 216 n.154 ("As Congress
possesses no power whatever to make international agreements, it has no such power to
delegate").
2 86 See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 216. For articles debating the constitutionality of executive
agreements, see ELBERT M. BYRD, JR., TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 152, 155 (1960) (rejecting the idea that treaties and executive agreements are complete
altematives); Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly ofForeign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1972) (suggesting that the Treaty Clause bars non-treaty executive agreements); Myres S.
McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable Instruments ofNational Policy: 1, 54 YALELJ. 181 (1945) (suggesting that the
treaty-making procedure and agreement making procedure are interchangeable); Kenneth C.
Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1089 (1990) (focusing on the subject matter of
agreements formed).
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theoretical arguments, the Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress is
empowered to regulate foreign affairs independent of its authority to implement
valid treaties,287 and that congressional-executive agreements are constitutional.288
In fact, congressional-executive agreements are widely used as an alternative to
treaties in connection with trade.289
Congressional-executive agreements, like treaties, are considered the law of the
land with supremacy over conflicting state laws. 90 They are generally considered
interchangeable with treaties.291 If congressional-executive agreements enjoy the
same status as treaties, then they too should not be "subject to any curtailment or
interference on the part of the several states,"292 and Missouri v. Holland should
also allow Congress to legislate in areas otherwise outside of its enumerated powers.
Accordingly, Congress should be able to federalize trade secrets law, pursuant to its
foreign affairs power to implement NAFTA and GATT, without regard to any
287 See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (noting that although the
Constitution does not expressly grant Congress authority to regulate foreign affhirs, "there can be
no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation"); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (stating that the powers of the United
States to conduct foreign affairs do not derive from the Constitution, but are inherent from the
sovereignty ofthe nation); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,603-04 (1889) (holding
that Congress could legislate to exclude aliens, based on race, because it is a power "incident of
every independent nation").
288 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (stating that international
agreements, like treaties, are to be given supremacy over state law); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at
318 (stating that "the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties"
is one of those powers which, though not explicitly granted by the Constitution, exists in the
federal government as inherent in national sovereignty).
289 See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 218.
2 90 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (giving a sole executive
agreement, signed with Iran, effect as law); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (holding that "the external
powers" ofthe country, whether exercised through treaties or executive compacts and agreements,
cannot be subject to state laws or policies); HENKIN, supra note 26, at 217 (such an agreement
supersedes inconsistent state laws).
291 See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 217. But see GATTImplementing Legislation: Hearings
on S.2469 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 285-
339 (1994) (statement ofLaurence H. Tnbe) (arguing that congressional-executive agreements and
treaties are not wholly interchangeable and that the Uruguay Round so impinges on state
sovereignty that it should be passed as a treaty). However, Professor Tribe later qualified, or
retracted, his earlier opposition to the implementation of GATT/Uuguay Round as a
congressional-executive agreement. See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to Senator George J.
Mitchell (Nov. 28, 1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. S 15,078 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (I
regard as my responsibility, in light of Assistant Attorney General Dellinger's recent forceful
analysis, to say that I believe the Clinton Administration has based its position on the Uruguay
Round Agreements on constitutional arguments that are both powerful and plausible.").
292 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
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possible intrusion into state powers.
With both NAFTA and GATr, however, there is an additional wrinkle. In
implementing these international agreements into domestic law, Congress
apparently chose to limit the exercise of its own powers. The implementing acts do
not incorporate the substantive terms of the respective international agreements by
reference, in which event the terms of the agreements would have become federal
law.293 Instead, they explicitly state that no state law nor its application may be
declared invalid as contrary with the international agreements, except in an action
brought for such purpose by the United States.294 Indeed, even an international
determination, made by an appropriate dispute settlement panel, that a specific state
law is inconsistent with either of the trade agreements does not operate to preempt
the state law.295 To ensure that state laws will be made to conform to the
international agreements as required, the implementing acts merely provide that the
President will "consult with the States for the purpose of achieving conformity of
State laws" 296 in regard to the trade agreements.
The implementing statutes clearly indicate, then, Congress's intention not to
preempt state law when it approved NAFTA and TRIPS. However, if
congressional-executive agreements are constitutional, and if Missouri v. Holland
has equal application to them, then Congress does have constitutional authority
under its foreign affairs power to preempt state law to fulfill the country's
international obligations. Its declining to do so earlier would seem to be just that-a
293 See NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (1994)); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994)).
294 See NAFTA Implementation Act § 102(b)(2), 107 Stat. at 2063 ("No State law, or the
application thereof, may be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that
the provision or application is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action brought by the
United States for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid"); Uruguay Round
Agreements Act § 102(b)(2)(A), 108 Stat. at 4817. This section provides:
No State law, or the application of such a State law, may be declared invalid as to any
person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with
any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, except in an action brought by the United States for
the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.
Id.
2 95 See NAFTA Implementation Act § 102(b)(2)(B), 107 Stat. at 2063 (stating that any
finding by an international dispute settlement panel against a state law is not binding against the
state in any action brought by the U.S. challenging the state law, and imposing the burden of proof
on the issue on the U.S.); Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102 (bX2)(B), 108 Stat. at 4817
(same).
296 NAFTA Implementation Act § 102 (b)(1XA), 107 Stat. at 2062; Uruguay Round
Agreements Act § 102 (b)(1XA), 108 Stat. at 4815.
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judgment or decision that subsequent Congresses can reverse because Congress, or
any branch of the government for that matter, cannot "waive" its constitutional
powers.2 97 Thus, Congress may be able to find support in its foreign affairs power
for any federal trade secrets legislation designed to satisfy U.S. obligations on trade
secret protection under NAFTA and TRIPS.
3. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Power
Of all of the granted powers, the Commerce Clause, which allows Congress to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce,298 is probably the strongest constitutional
basis for federal action. Although the Supreme Court in 1995 did limit the reach of
the clause in United States v. Lopez,299 not even the broadest reading of that case
bars a federal trade secrets law containing an appropriate jurisdictional element.
Furthermore, given the significant link between trade secrets as a class and interstate
commerce, one can reasonably argue that Lopez does not forbid even a statute
without a jurisdictional element requiring case-by-case determination of the effect
on interstate commerce.
From 1937 until Lopez, it was well-established that the Commerce Clause
permitted Congress to regulate not only the use of the "channels of interstate and
foreign commerce" 300 and "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce"
irrespective of whether the threat came from interstate activities,30 1 but also wholly
intrastate activities that affected interstate commerce. 30 2 The clause was also
2 97 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (stating that states cannot
consent to federal overreaching any more than one branch of the government can consent to the
encroachment of its constitutional powers by another branch of the government).
29 8 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (conferring upon Congress the legislative powers "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes").
299 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that a federal law prohibiting the possession of
firearms within a school zone exceeded the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce).
Much has been written critiquing Lopez and analyzing its meaning and implications. See, e.g.,
Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793 (1996);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's
Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213 (1996).
30 0 See, e.g., Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936) (upholding statute forbidding
the interstate transportation of kidnapped persons); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,491
(1917) (stating that the authority of Congress to "keep the channels of interstate commerce free
from immoral and injurious uses" under its commerce powers was clear and "no longer open to
question").
301 See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342,358-60 (1914) (sustaining congressional
authority to reach intrastate rail rates that discriminated against interstate railroad traffic).
302 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
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construed to reach intrastate matters when their regulation was necessary for the
effective regulation of interstate commerce.303 Over the years, Congress has enacted
an array of far-reaching legislation regulating intrastate economic activities based
on its judgment that a sufficient interstate commerce nexus existed. Examples
include acts covering intrastate coal mining,304 intrastate "loan sharking" (or
extortionate credit transactions),305 and even the production and consumption of
home-grown wheat;30 6 laws prohibiting racial discrimination in public
accommodations,30 7 and laws establishing minimum wages and working
conditions.308 In every case from 1937 until Lopez, the Supreme Court deferred to
congressional judgment that its acts were within the purview of the Commerce
Clause309 and never found the limits of the commerce power crossed.
In invalidating a federal act for exceeding Congress's commerce powers in
1995, Lopez did serve notice that the long-standing assumptions about judicial
restraint and the breadth of the Commerce Clause no longer hold true.310 However,
(upholding provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precluding racial discrimination in public
accommodations under the Commerce Clause and stating that, even if the operation of the motel
were purely local, Congress could regulate it if the discriminatory activities have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (holding that
wheat grown wholly for home consumption fell within the scope of federal regulation of wheat
production because it supplied the needs of the grower and therefore affected the price of wheat
in the open market); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942) (holding
that Congress could regulate the price of intrastate milk because the sale of intrastate milk, in
competition with interstate milk, affected federal regulation of the latter); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 119-23 (1941) (upholding a federal statute prohibiting the employment ofworkers
at below prescribed wages in the production of goods within a state for interstate commerce).
303 See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. 111-33; Darby, 312 U.S. at 100-26; N.L.R.B. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 342-60; McDermott
v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
304 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
305 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
306 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111-33.
307 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at
241-93.
308 See Darby, 312 U.S. at 100-26; Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 310 U.S. at 1-49.
309 The Court generally limited its inquiry to a determination of whether there was a "rational
basis" to support Congress's finding of an effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Virginia
Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 276; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
310 The Supreme Court also limited Congress's far-reaching legislative powers under the
Constitution in a number ofrecent decisions other than Lopez. See Printz v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (ruling that the part of the Brady gun law that compelled state officials to
help implement a federal gun control program was unconstitutional); City ofBoeme v. Flores, 117
S. Ct. 2157,2171-72 (1997) (holding that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
which prohibited states from substantially burdening a person's free exercise of religion without
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the majority in Lopez never rejected the principle that the Commerce Clause permits
congressional regulation of intrastate activities "having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce." 311
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990,312 a law that made the possession of a gun on school premises a federal
crime, primarily for three reasons. First, the majority said that the criminal statute
was aimed at ordinary violence and had "nothing to do with 'commerce."' 313
Second, it faulted Congress for making no factual findings to support its "legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce '314
and suggested that such findings might have made a difference. 315 Third, it
expressed the fear that upholding the law based on an "inference upon inference'
of an impact on interstate commerce would result in federal regulation of education
and assumption of police powers that are traditionally the domain of the states.316
Given the concerns expressed in Lopez, it is unlikely that federal regulation of
trade secrets would offend the Supreme Court. By its very nature, a federal trade
secrets law would be radically different from the invalidated gun act. Unlike the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, federal trade secrets legislation would be aimed
directly at commercial activities. The causal chain between trade secret protection
a "compelling governmental interest," even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, exceeded Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44,75-76 (1996) (invalidating that portion ofthe Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
that allowed Native American tribes to sue states in federal court to compel states to negotiate with
the tribes in good faith in disputes regarding the establishment of casinos).
311 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (reiterating the three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause, which include
intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce).
Justice Kennedy, concurring, specifically warned against narrowly interpreting the term
interstate commerce in a way that "would serve only an 18th century economy," and he stated his
belief in the "practical" interpretation of "commerce" that has existed since the New Deal. See id.
at 573. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas, concurring, alone argued that modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
illegitimate, and that Congress's commerce powers should be limited to activities in connection
with interstate "selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transportation for these purposes," not
manufacturing or other productive activities, which should be subject only to state regulation. See
id. at 585-88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
312 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. II. 1990).
3 13 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61. Justice Breyer, dissenting, rejected the majority's
commercial/noncommercial distinction and argued that the test should not be whether the
legislation regulates commerce, but rather whether the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce). See id. at 627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
3 14 Id. at 562-63.
315 See id. at 561-62.
316 See id. at 567.
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(or non-protection) and interstate commerce is direct, not attenuated, and the effect
on interstate commerce is substantial, as Congress specifically found in enacting the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.3 17 Furthermore, although Congress, so far, has
not attempted to regulate trade secrets beyond enactment of the EEA, matters of
competition and economic regulation are not areas traditionally or inherently
reserved for the states.318
Because Lopez acknowledged that Congress may regulate "those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce," 319 a federal trade secrets law
containing an appropriate jurisdictional element would clearly be constitutional
under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, the majority in Lopez noted the absence of a
jurisdictional element in the Gun-Free School Zones Act and suggested that its
inclusion might have saved it.3 2 0 A jurisdictional provision, such as that found in
the antitrust law,321 would limit the law's reach to activities having the necessary
nexus to interstate commerce, thus guaranteeing its constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause.
But even without a jurisdictional provision, a federal trade secrets act would
still be sustainable under the Commerce Clause. As long as Congress determines
that a class of activities, in the aggregate, exerts a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, it can be argued that the entire class is within the scope of the
Commerce Clause without the need for case-by-case jurisdictional analysis.322
Cases such as Perez v. United States323 have looked to the class of activities as a
whole to determine the constitutionality of a congressional act.324 If the collective
effect of the class on interstate commerce is substantial, the law can be found
constitutional and applied to all within the class, including individual members or
activities without the requisite connection with interstate commerce. 325
3 17 See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text
318 See, e.g., Federal Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-35 (1994) (also known as the "Sherman
Act").
3 19 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 ("Congress's commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.').
320 See id at 561-62.
321 See Sherman Act § 1 (1994) (prohibiting agreements in restraint of "trade or commerce
among the several States").
322 But see John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MIcH. L. REv. 174 (1998).
323 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
324 See also Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (finding that wheat grown for
home consumption was within the scope of federal regulation of wheat production because of the
aggregate effect that wheat grown for home consumption exerts on the demand and price of wheat
involved in interstate commerce).
325 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-56 (1971).
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For example, in Perez, the "loan sharking" law under which the defendant was
convicted penalized the use of, or threat to use, violence in the collection of a debt.
It had no jurisdictional element limiting its application to activities having a
substantial relationship to interstate commerce, and there was no connection
between any of the activities in Perez and interstate commerce.326 Still, because
Congress had found that "loan shardng" activities substantially affected interstate
commerce, the Court held that the legislation could extend to the entire class of
activities, and it was irrelevant that the defendant's particular activities were purely
intrastate.327
It would seem easy, under Perez, to justify a federal trade secrets law without
a jurisdictional element The legislative history of the EEA includes findings about
the close relationship between trade secrecy and interstate commerce, the
importance of trade secrets to the national economy, the substantial effect of trade
secrets and trade secret misappropriation on interstate and foreign commerce, and
the ease and frequency with which trade secrets are misappropriated across state and
national lines.3 28 These findings are surely enough to find that trade secrets (or trade
secret misappropriation) constitute a class of activities whose aggregate impact on
interstate commerce is so substantial that Congress can reach all trade secret
misappropriation without a case-by-case assessment of interstate impact.
Even in light of Lopez, this interpretation and application of Perez would not
be overly broad. Lopez cautions against adopting a Commerce Clause test that
would effectively allow Congress to regulate everything that is deemed
important. 329 But it also concedes that "where a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no consequence." 330 A federal trade secrets law
would establish a scheme that strikes a proper balance between protecting
innovators and not unduly hindering others' use of information. Such a program is
clearly related to interstate commerce, and therefore, the intrastate nature of a
particular instance of misappropriation, such as a local business stealing a customer
list from a competitor down the block, for example, should be irrelevant.331 Given
326 See id at 147-48.
327 See id at 154 ("Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach
of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' ofthe class:)
(emphasis omitted).
32 8 See supra note 207.
32 9 See Nagle, supra note 322.
330 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,558 (1995) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183, 197 (1968)) (emphasis omitted).
331 Although an act of misappropriation may be local, it is unlikely that all aspects relating
to the development and use of the trade secret are local, or that all benefits gained by, or losses
suffered from, the misappropriation are entirely local. Aggregating the effects of these so-called
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the "commerce" nature of all trade secrets, aggregating their interstate effects to
support the regulation of the occasional purely intrastate misappropriation does not
run the risk of leaving nothing to the states-against which Lopez admonishes.
B. Policy Considerations
That a federal law is constitutionally permissible does not necessarily mean, of
course, that it is advisable. The policies favoring the enactment of a federal trade
secrets law have been discussed in previous parts of this Article. This section
focuses on whether there are drawbacks to the enactment of such a law from the
perspective of thepolicy of federalism. It addresses the values generally claimed for
federalism and concludes that federalizing trade secrets law would not unduly
undermine them.
Despite the proliferation of federal power from the Depression and New Deal
in the 1930s through the Civil Rights era of the 1960s and 1970s,332 Americans
have long venerated the policy of federalism, or the division of power between
federal and state government 333 Several principal themes are often invoked in favor
of federalism.334 One such theme is that it diffuses power between two distinct
govemments335 and, in so doing, serves as a check on potential abuses of
local misappropriations should have sufficient impact on interstate commerce to take it within the
scope of the Commerce Clause.
3 32 For a discussion of the evolution of federalism, see ALICE M. RivLIN, REVIviNG THE
AMERiCAN DREAM: T-M ECONOMY, THE STATES & THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 85-100 (1992).
333 See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 190 (1996)
(remarking that "[r]arely has a concept so difficult to define as federalism been so venerated");
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 903, 906 (1994) (observing that "[w]e Americans love federalism .... It conjures up
images of Fourth of July parades down Main Street, drugstore soda fountains, and family farms
with tire swings in the front yard.").
334 It should be noted that some scholars are skeptical of the supposed virtues of federalism.
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1485 (1994)
(observing that conflicting benefits and harms have been attributed to federalism); Rubin & Feeley,
supra note 333, at 907-08 (terming American attachment to federalism a neurosis and asserting
that federalism achieves none of the benefits attributed to it). Some argue that federalism is merely
a tool Congress uses to rationalize conflicting policies and that it has not really served as a coherent
policy guide. See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to
Devolution?, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 429, 430-31 (1996) (noting the contradiction in
Congress's attempts to reform tort law, an area historically reserved to the states, and its efforts to
remove welfare matters from federal authority and concluding that devolution is not a matter of
principle but rather of "whose ox is being gored"); Gordon, supra note 333, at 192-94 (discussing
the "slipperiness" of the federalism concept).
335 See, e.g., SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION 386-88 (1993) (emphasizing
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government power from either front.336 On this issue, Justice O'Connor has written
with almost impassioned rhetoric that federalism "protects us from our own best
intentions... so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day."337
Although any exercise of national power probably presents some risk to liberty
(in the federalism sense), the threat that is posed by a federal civil trade secrets law
is modest. Such a law is unlikely to foster government tyranny or have the effect of
amplifying government power at the expense of the individual, for it merely
allocates rights by defining what is protectable and the scope of that protection. It
does not entail government spending or taxation. Weighed against the myriad
benefits of having a uniform law and policy on this matter, the moderate risks
associated with some concentration of federal power seem worth taking.
Another benefit commonly attributed to federalism is that it '"makes
government more responsive by putting the states in competition for a mobile
citizenry."338 The idea is that under federalism, states will compete with each other
for citizens and businesses through the enactment and enforcement of laws that
produce a favorable environment.339 It is expected that businesses and individuals
will vote with their feet by moving to, or staying in, states with laws that they deem
most attractive.340 This, in turn, is said to result in greater efficiency for the country.
Assuming that federalism does produce such an effect it still has little
federalism's role in diffusing government power); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. Cr. REv. 81, 87-107 (commenting on
the division of power and political accountability that federalism affords); D. Bruce La Pierre,
Political Accountability in the National Political Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of
Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 579-83 (1985) (same); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence ofFederalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 341,
380-414 (discussing the importance of small governments for the protection of human rights).
336 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (stating that federalism ensures
protection of individual liberties and reduces the risk of "tyranny and abuse" from either the federal
or state governments); Gregory v. Ashcrofi, 501 U.S. 452,456-60 (1991) (stating that a balance
of power between the state and the federal government will protect both fronts).
337 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
338 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
339 For discussion of federalism as generating competition among the states, see THOMAS R.
DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALIsM: COMPETON AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); Richard A. Epstein,
Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (1992); Richard B. Stewart,
Federalism and Rights, 18 GA. L. REV. 917 (1987); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
340 This government competition theory is based on the competitive market economic model
in which government policies are determined strictly by market forces. Each individual or business
is presumed to be fully informed, highly mobile, and willing to locate in the jurisdiction that offers
the preferred economic package. For a detailed discussion of the economic case for federalism, see
Tiebout, supra note 339.
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relevance in the context of trade secrets law. In today's information-based
industries, trade secret misappropriation may, and often does, occur in any state, not
just in the state of the trade secret owner's place of business or incorporation.
Moreover, choice of law analysis does not turn solely on the location of the trade
secret owner or of the alleged misappropriator. Nor does it depend only on the place
of the alleged misdeed. Thus, it is very difficult for a trade secret owner, or a
potential misappropriator, to determine in advance which state's substantive law
would control. Therefore, a state is unlikely to adopt strong protective measures for
trade secrets in an effort to attract businesses desirous of keeping more of their
information secret, since there is no presumption that such a law would apply if a
business within its jurisdiction were to become a victim of trade secret
misappropriation. Neither is a state likely to attempt to entice free riders or perhaps
heavy users of information in the public domain by providing the narrowest trade
secrets law (or no protection at all), since there is no guarantee that the law would
apply simply because the user resides, engages in business, or conducts the
supposed misdeed in that state. As a practical matter, it seems doubtful that trade
secrets law would play much of a role in either attracting or repulsing businesses to
or from a given state.
A third value that is often claimed for federalism is that it "increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes. '341 The underlying
premise of this notion is that a smaller state government is more conducive to
greater citizen participation than the large national government.342 Therefore,
allocating more power to the state should encourage citizens to take action aimed
at influencing government policy. Again, assuming the merits of the claim, it has
little application in the conteit of trade secrets law. Trade secret misappropriation
frequently implicates the interests of two or more states, and neither the trade secret
owner's nor the alleged misappropriator's place of business or incorporation is
pivotal in choice of law analysis. Thus, there is little incentive for businesses located
within that state to participate in the state political process in order to attain the trade
secrets law of their choice, whether it be a broad one in the case of cutting-edge
innovators or a narrow one in the case of businesses who tend to be "copiers" of
existing information.
Of the benefits generally proclaimed for federalism, 343 perhaps the only one of
341 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. For discussion ofthe benefit of federalism in increasing citizen
involvement, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1067-74
(1980); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLuM.
L. REV. 847, 853-55 (1979).
342 Presumably, with fewer participants in the state, access to politicians would be easier,
information about the government more readily available, and each vote would have more impact
343 The mantra of states' rights is sometimes also used to justify a policy against federal
intervention, especially during the Civil Rights era when southern states resisted federal legislation
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any significant relevance in the case of trade secrets is the idea, first expressed by
Justice Brandeis, that federalism allows states to serve as "laboratories" of
"experimentation." 344 Providing states an opportunity to experiment with different
solutions is considered positive because it has the potential of producing a number
of alternatives from which the best solution may ultimately emerge.345 It also helps
avoid possibly the greatest threat posed by the enactment of a federal law:
magnifying fifty-fold any error made.
Although this factor may militate somewhat against federalizing trade secrets
law, it must be balanced against other interests favoring federal intervention. Trade
secrets law have repercussions beyond the borders of a single state. An excessively
narrow trade secrets law imposed by one state, for example, can have devastating
ramifications for trade secret owners located throughout the country. Conversely,
an overly broad trade secrets law may adversely affect the rights of second comers
doing business in every state. Because of the impact of any trade secrets law on the
nation as a whole, a federal solution seems most appropriate and desirable, for it
would provide the interstate coordination that has been lacking but which appears
necessary to properly regulate intellectual property.
V. THE LAW THAT IS ENVISIONED
Finally, while it is beyond the scope of this Article to propose the actual form
and content of a new federal trade secrets law, this Part will briefly describe the
general scope of the law that is envisioned. The new federal legislation could
basically resemble the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as amended in 1985. Although
many states have deviated from the UTSA, there is no common pattern to the
changes which would suggest inherent flaws with the uniform act. A federal trade
secrets law should, of course, comply with the substantive standards established in
NAFTA and TRIPS. More importantly, it should preserve the balance between
protection on the one hand and disclosure and competition on the other hand, which
has been crafted into the existing federal intellectual property system. The UTSA
aimed at ending racial discrimination. But it would seem that the proper focus should be on the
rights of the ultimate beneficiaries of states' rights--the people. See New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 181-82 (1992) (stating that states could not waive Tenth Amendment structural
protections because the people, not the states, are the ultimate beneficiaries of states' rights).
344See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (suggesting that federalism "allows for more
innovation and experimentation in govemment!'). On state experimentation as a benefit of
federalism, see Kaden, supra note 341, at 853-55.
345 See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.").
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seems to meet both objectives. First, it was the model on which the trade secret
provisions in NAFTA and TRIPS were based, and therefore essentially meets the
minimum standards established in those trade agreements. Second, the model act
has carefully avoided infringing on the domains of the patent and copyright laws.
For example, recognizing that society does not exact anything tangible from the
owner of a trade secret in return for protection, such as disclosure of the secret for
the public's future use, the UTSA does not grant exclusivity to the owner; it only
protects the owner against another's taking of her information in a morally
reprehensible manner (improper means), and only if the information or knowledge
was in fact secret, which means not already in the public domain.
Another important issue that should be decided is whether or not a federal trade
secrets law should be preemptive. When Congress acts pursuant to a granted power,
it can exclusively occupy the field and preempt state authority because of the
Supremacy Clause, if it so chooses. 346 Or, it can allow concurrent state
regulation. 347 As to the concerns raised by NAFTA and TRIPS, Congress could
easily enact a federal law that will provide the minimum protections demanded by
the international agreements and still allow states to provide greater trade secret
protection. In other words, preemption would not be necessary to ensure that the
United States meets its international obligations. However, allowing concurrent
state regulation would not resolve problems associated with the lack of uniformity
and other issues raised in this Article. For this reason, a preemptive law along the
lines of section 301 of the Copyright Act348 is preferable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The case for federalizing trade secrets law, the only intellectual property law
not currently covered by federal regulation, is compelling. The nature of trade
secrecy has changed dramatically over the years. From its roots as primarily a
secondary source of intellectual property protection for less significant innovations,
it has evolved into an important incentive for innovation in its own right. Given the
new prominence of trade secrets law, the increasing connection between trade
secrets and interstate and foreign commerce, and the enactment of NAFTA and
TRIPS, the lack of uniformity in the law, perhaps once acceptable, is now
problematic.
A federal trade secrets law will find constitutional support in Congress's
commerce power and, probably, foreign affairs power. Although enacting such a
law may be politically sensitive in this era of hyper-sensitivity to federalism, it
3 4 6 SeeU.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. For an example of federal law specifically preempting state
law, see The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
34 7 See The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-35 (1994).
34 8 See 17 U.S.C. § 301.
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should be noted that simply because an area of the law has long been in the states'
domain does not mean that it must remain so forever. After all, the law of antitrust
was also once a matter of state law. Yet, rising concerns about the effects of trade
restraints on interstate commerce led Congress to pass the Sherman Act over a
century ago. The circumstances existing today warrant federal regulation of trade
secrets, just as the environment in 1890 justified federalizing antitrust laws at that
time.
